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I
INTRODUCTION

Proposals for significant reform in the structure and behavior of health
care markets, and in the way these markets are regulated, invariably confront
claims that the proposed changes will result in a lessening of the quality of
care provided.' Demands for broader access to health care services during
the 1950's and 1960's, for more effective control of spiraling costs in the
1970's and 1980's, and for some measure of deregulation, have all been met
with similar assertions. 2 Not surprisingly, the intrusion of antitrust and the
interjection of a "dose of competition" into health care markets have raised
similar issues. 3 Quality of care is a central concern in virtually any discussion
of health care policy; the antitrust policy to be applied in health care markets
is no exception.
The focus of this paper is on the appropriate consideration to be given
quality-of-care concerns in antitrust cases. In one sense, the focus is narrow,
confined to but one aspect of public policy in the health care field. But within
the confines of antitrust policy, the issue is pervasive.
For decades, health care services markets have functioned, for better or
worse, without the constraints imposed on markets by competitive market
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1. This is at least in part attributable to the tendency of health care professionals to view
themselves as those best qualified to determine appropriate levels of quality of care. Physicians have
been, and continue to be, "the leading exponents of quality in medical care." Havighurst &
Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 6,
25 (1975). Historically, physicians have identified quality with a "free choice" ethic, under which
each practiced as an autonomous unit. See generally Weller, "Free Choice" as a Restraint of Trade in
American Health Care Delivery and Insurance, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1351 (1984).
2. Opposition by the American Medical Association ("AMA") to group medical practice, for
example, was put partially in quality-of-care terms. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317
U.S. 519 (1943). In recent years, opposition to attempts by insurers and the government to contain
health care costs have been attacked on quality-of-care grounds. One of the most recent areas of
such conflict is the Medicare prospective payment system. See generally Kinney, Making Hard Choices
Under the Medicare Prospective Payment System: One Administrative Model for Allocating Resources Under a
Government Health Insurance Program, 19 IND. L. REV. 1151 (1986).
3. See generally Blumstein & Sloan, Redefining Governments Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of
Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1981).
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pressures. Regulation by public authorities has been sporadic and confined to
particular segments of these markets and to specific elements of their
performance. 4 Such regulation has often been informal and has generally
proceeded without regard to the relationship between public regulation and
antitrust. 5 Self-regulation has been the norm. Actors in these markets long
assumed that the antitrust laws were of little or no relevance to their conduct.
As a result, health care services markets have been characterized by a variety
of structures and actions which in most other industries would raise serious
antitrust questions. The introduction of antitrust policy into these markets
has therefore resulted in direct challenges to a broad range of conduct within
a short period of time. As one plaintiff's antitrust attorney said to me,
"Health care is a field ripe for the picking." Given the pervasiveness of selfregulation and other collaborative conduct in these markets, antitrust issues
are now also pervasive. In virtually every instance, the concern over quality of
care is likely to be raised in justification for the conduct under antitrust attack.
A doctor is denied hospital staff privileges. 6 Hospitals deny access to
midwives or chiropractors, 7 or enter into exclusive contracts with providers
for the performance of specialized services. 8 Groups of local hospitals, acting
4. Apart from licensing requirements, most governmental economic regulation is targeted at
hospitals. Hospital facilities and services have been controlled to some extent through health
planning and certificate-of-need programs and through Medicare and Medicaid requirements
including, inter alia, the Professional Standards Review Organization ("PSRO"). In some states,
hospital rates and/or revenues are directly regulated. These programs are briefly described in
Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 3, at 866-76.
5. For example, in enacting the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of
1974, Congress paid little attention to the relationship between antitrust and the health planning it
mandated. See National Gerimedical Hosp. v. Blue Cross of Kansas City, 452 U.S. 378 (1981);
Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir. 1982). State legislation
requiring hospitals to engage in quality review has also reflected an inattention to antitrust. As a
result, courts have had difficulty in determining whether the state action exemption applies to peerreview activities undertaken pursuant to such legislation. Compare Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748
F.2d 373 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1984), with Tambone v. Memorial Hospital for
1986), and Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F.
McHenry County, 635 F. Supp. 508 (N.D. Ill.
Supp. 1226 (D. Del. 1985). The Supreme Court has held that Oregon legislation did not exempt
peer review in that state from antitrust scrutiny, Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988), but the
decision does not necessarily extend to other states.
6. There are literally scores of these cases. For recent examples, see Goss v. Memorial Hosp.
System, 789 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1986); Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp., 782 F.2d 609 (6th Cir.
1986). For extended discussions of staff privileges cases see Blumstein & Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital
Peer Review, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 7; Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe,
Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1982); Note,
Denying Hospital Privileges to Non-Physicians: Does Quality of Care Justify a Potential Restraint of Trade?, 19
IND. L. REV. 1219 (1986) [hereinafter Denying Hospital Privileges].
7. As to nurse-midwives, see Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982); Comment, Hospital Privileges for Nurse Midwives: An Examination under Antitrust Law, 33
AM. U.L. REV. 959 (1984). With respect to denial of privileges to chiropractors, see Aasum v. Good
Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363 (D. Or. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1976); Note, Health
Professionals'Access to Hospitals: A Retrospective and Prospective Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1191-95
(1981) [hereinafter Health Professionals' Access to Hospitals]. Chiropractors have also attacked the
policies of medical societies and accrediting groups which have impaired their access to hospital
facilities. See, e.g., Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1210 (1984) (discussed in detail infra text at notes 190-200).
8. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); Kuck v. Bensen,
647 F. Supp. 743 (D. Me. 1986).
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on their own or through regional planning groups, determine which hospitals
will have emergency or burn treatment facilities. 9 Doctors agree on, or
communicate about, the amounts they will accept in reimbursement from
insurers, or collaborate to resist other efforts by insurers to reduce costs.' 0 A
hospital is denied accreditation by an accrediting group which relies in part on
judgments by other hospitals. ' A physician is denied specialist certification
by an organization made up of such specialists.' 2 A hospital (or group of
hospitals) opposes the issuance of a certificate of need to a potential
competitor. '

3

In each of these cases, serious antitrust issues may be raised. And in each
the actors may advance quality-of-care justifications, ranging from the need to
keep incompetent physicians from providing care at all to the assertion that
greater reimbursement is needed if quality is to be assured. The competitive
issues in each case vary, as do the concerns over quality of care. These
concerns may be real or imagined, provable or unprovable, and of greater or
lesser consequence depending upon the conduct at issue and the magnitude
of the restraint involved. But running through this broad range of cases is a
single issue which is the central focus of this study. When, if ever, should an
antitrust court weigh the impact of conduct on quality of care?
The impact of provider or insurer conduct on the quality of patient care
may be interjected into antitrust analysis in one of two ways. First, and most
often, the claim may be advanced that a particular restraint is necessary in
9. See Ohio Att'y Gen. Opin. No. 80-059. Horizontal division of markets along product lines is
generally a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Hartford Empire Co. v. United States,
323 U.S. 386 (1945). Agreements among hospitals with respect to services to be provided that are
carried out through regional health planning bodies authorized by federal law thus may violate the
antitrust laws unless the federal legislation expressly or impliedly immunizes the conduct from
antitrust attack. See National Gerimedical Hosp. and Gerontology Center v. Blue Cross of Kansas
City, 452 U.S. 378 (1981); Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hosp., 691 F.2d 678 (4th Cir.
1982).
10. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (agreement by
physicians on rates to be reimbursed by insurers); Ratino v. Medical Service of the District of
Columbia, 718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983); Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983). See
also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (dentists' collective refusal to supply Xrays to insurers); Pennsylvania Dental Ass'n v. Medical Service Ass'n of Pennsylvania, 815 F.2d 270
(3d Cir.) (dentists' collective refusal to refuse participation in Blue Shield plan), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct.
153 (1987). Cf Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, Docket No. 9171, 107 F.T.C. 510, 3 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH)
22,373 (1986), (boycott by lawyers of District of Columbia criminal indigent plan to
force increase in reimbursement rates) rev 'd and remanded, 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 1741 (1989). Compare United States v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.
N.D. 1986) (agreement by hospitals regarding Medicaid reimbursement rate). See generally Raup,
Medicaid Boycotts by Health Care Providers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 1393 (1984).
11. See Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic v. American Chiropractic Ass'n, Inc., 654 F.
Supp. 716 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aft'd, 813 F.2d 349 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 160 (1987). Cf
Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools,
Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), discussed in Havighurst & King, Private
Credentialingof Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective (Part One), 9 AM. J. L. & MED. 131, 164-71
(1984); Kissam, Antitrust Law, the First Amendment, and Professional Self-Regulation of Technical Quality, in
REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS

143-45 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).

12. See, e.g., Koefoot v. American College of Surgeons, 652 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill.1986)
(discussed in detail infra note 186).
13. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948 (11th Cir. 1986).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 5 1: No. 2

order to assure that the quality of care does not deteriorate. The most
common example is the assertion that a physician who has been denied
hospital staff privileges is incompetent. Second, conduct might be attacked
precisely because it impairs quality of care. Such a case is hard to imagine, but
possible. In some circumstances, such conduct may be viewed as a restriction
on output. 14 While the second case is imaginable, most such cases will run
afoul of other antitrust doctrines without direct examination of quality-of-care
effects.' 5 This paper will focus primarily on the first of these categories.
6
When, if ever, should there be a quality-of-care "defense"?'
Part II will develop a general framework for analysis. Part III will examine
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Wilk, a decision
that deals more directly than most with quality-of-care issues. Part IV will
examine quality-of-care concerns in a variety of other cases.
Before turning to the development of an analytical framework, several
factors that have undoubtedly influenced courts in an indirect way should be
noted. Seldom dealt with directly, these factors do not fit neatly into
conventional doctrine but may have affected outcomes to a greater extent
than reliance on existing rules or economic analysis.
First, whatever else may be said about quality of care in a particular
setting, the appropriate quality of care is in most instances virtually
impossible to define. Even outside the field of health care, product quality is
an elusive concept. How, for example, do we as consumers determine the
quality of an automobile, or even of a can of tomatoes? In the case of the
former, quality may mean a powerful engine or, conversely, high gasoline
mileage. An automobile's quality may refer to incidence of repair, or physical
appearance. One may value tomatoes because of their color, taste,
consistency, or other ingredients. Quality is in the eye of the beholder or,
more particularly, the consumer. And, at least given limited resources,
consumer decisions about quality involve tradeoffs and consideration of price.
As an abstraction, consumers may desire automobiles with mileage ratings in
excess of 100 miles per gallon, but they may not value such mileage enough to
pay the price such capability would require. Quality without regard to price is
a relatively meaningless concept. These ideas are all commonplace and
reflect nothing more than the role of the market in determining quality.
Because there is no single perception of quality, in most cases there is no
standard by which a court or administrative body can determine that
alterations in a product either enhance or degrade its quality. In a few simple
cases, such judgments may be possible. If the shelf life of a can of tomatoes is
extended from six months to one year by a costless change in the canning
See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 35 (1978).
15. Such conduct will generally be accompanied by direct price and output effects. An
agreement among competitors to lessen quality by using less costly materials would normally be
accompanied by an agreement on the price to be charged for the product.
16. Gordon, Taking the Temperature of the Quality of Care Defense: Is It Critical? (paper
presented at program of Antitrust Section, Am. Bar Ass'n, San Francisco, Cal., Aug., 1987).

14.
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process which involves no food additives and leaves the contents unchanged,
all may agree that quality is enhanced. But the more complex the product, the
more the tradeoffs in other elements of the product the change requires, and
the more generalized the claim of improvement, the more difficult the task
becomes.
Given these difficulties, is there at least some minimal quality level which
can be identified and against which claims of quality deterioration can be
measured? The examples given above made no reference to what may seem
an obvious quality concern, namely the safety of the product. A can of
tomatoes should not poison those who consume it. An automobile should not
catch fire each time the ignition key is turned. Under no circumstances would
consumers knowingly purchase such a product. Product safety regulation
assumes the ability of courts and administrative bodies to make such
judgments and to provide regulatory standards, at least in cases where harm
may occur before the consumer is aware of the defect. Even these judgments
may not be simple. They, too, involve tradeoffs. But judges are accustomed
to the resolution of such specific safety issues. They may find the task of
evaluating product quality daunting, if not impossible, but once they deal with
a specific product defect and a claim of injury resulting from that defect they
may find the task much more manageable.
The difficulty of evaluating claims of product quality become even greater
in health care markets.' 7 Technology is complex. There are large gaps in
knowledge, with resulting scientific disagreement over what even constitutes
adequate care. In addition, many believe that everyone is entitled to the same
quality of care.
This egalitarian equality of access principle suggests that there is a single
quality standard, resulting either from the fact that all consumers desire the
best possible care, to the limit of their resources, or from a social policy which
demands such uniformity whether consumers desire it or not.' 8 In one sense,
17.

See generally Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34

VAND. L. REV. 965, 967-69 (1981); Beales, The Economics of Regulating the Professions, in REGULATING

THE PROFESSIONS 125, 127-34 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980); Preston, Competition and Contractingfor
Health Services in Ohio, 17 TOL. L. REV. 817, 819 (1986) ("Basically, no one agrees on what quality
means, or how to impose quality standards in our pluralistic and largely unregulated delivery
systems."). Apart from purely scientific issues and disagreements, there is little agreement over the
relationship between curing and caring. Enthoven, for example, asserts that health care
professionals define quality as "the maximum that medical care can do to prolong life or alleviate
suffering, costs not considered." A. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO
THE SOARING COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE 50 (1980).

But in many cases these ends are inconsistent. See

Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1090-106 (1981).
Because "quality of care" virtually defies definition, the emphasis of both governmental regulation
and programs of professional self-regulation has been on the process of evaluating professional
performance, rather than on outcomes. See Haug, The Sociological Approach to Self Regulation, in
REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 61, 64-66 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980); Havighurst & Blumstein,

supra note 1, at 25-30.
18. "During the twentieth century, most health care reformers apparently have agreed upon the
general idea of universal access-regardless of ability to pay-to a broadly adequate package of
socially financed benefits delivered under a single standard of care." Rosenblatt, supra note 17, at
1112. The debate over this egalitarian access principle, which has been ongoing for decades, is
beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that commitment to this ideal has been pervasive,
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the search for a single standard may appear to be easier than in the case where
it is acknowledged that quality demanded varies from consumer to consumer.
But quality of care is still constrained by the availability of resources, and
tradeoffs remain. More important, the egalitarian principle may itself be
contested. A judge asked to evaluate the impact of particular conduct on the
quality of health care is confronted not only with technological and scientific
complexity, but with broad social and political issues as well.
In such circumstances, judges and administrators may be expected to find
ways to avoid broad quality-of-care issues except in those cases where quality
standards seem obvious and the threat to public safety seems clear (as may be
the case, for example, where an obviously incompetent physician is denied
hospital staff privileges). They are not likely to seek a role either as the
ultimate arbiters of quality, or as Solomons deciding what level of care is
appropriate for whom. In antitrust cases, quality-of-care issues may be
avoided simply by finding that the conduct at issue has no adverse competitive
effects or is not otherwise within the antitrust laws. Some indication that this

is occurring is noted below. Avoidance of quality issues may also lead courts
in one of two other, but conflicting, directions. Deference may be given to the
views of those thought to be more knowledgeable, the very health care
professionals whose conduct is at issue. In conventional legal terms, such
deference may be reflected in the latitude given to self-regulation by
professional groups. 19 Self-regulation may be perceived as the most
appropriate way to assure quality of care, and its preservation becomes an end
which antitrust analysis must accommodate. A variety of restraints by
professional groups may be upheld with the assertion that self-regulation is
desirable, without evaluation of specific quality-of-care claims.
Courts might also avoid such evaluation by eliminating quality-of-care
"defenses" (or justifications) altogether, not on the grounds of irrelevance or
incompatibility with antitrust doctrine, but on the more practical ground that
in most cases such claims are either incapable of proof, or that the proof is
likely to be too complex or speculative. Precedent for such an approach may
be found in the views of a number of antitrust commentators who would not
permit proof of specific efficiencies as a defense in antitrust cases precisely
because the identification and quantification of efficiencies is beyond the
capability of the legal system.2 0 Similar logic might suggest that quality-ofcare assertions ought not be permitted because in the vast majority of cases

and a major impediment to health care reform. See, e.g., Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 3, at 859-66.
Even if "adequate care" is to be a universal standard, the fundamental problem of defining
"adequate care" remains. See Blumstein & Zubkoff, Perspectiveson Government Policy in the Health Sector,
57

Q. 395, 411 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124, 1144 (7th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 476
U.S. 447 (1986), quoted at note 72 infra; Kaczanowski v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., 612 F. Supp.
688, 697 (D. Vt. 1985) (Sherman Act does not "call upon courts to intrude upon a responsibility
reserved to medical decision makers").
MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND

20.

See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 14, at 124-29.
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they cannot be proven and/or quantified. In the name of judicial
administrability, then, all such claims should be rejected. 2'
Apart from the difficulties of defining quality of care and measuring the
impact on quality of particular conduct, judges may also be expected to reflect
a degree of skepticism about quality-of-care claims made by health care
professionals. Reform of health care structures and markets has been
countered time and again by assertions that change will endanger public
health and safety through deterioration in the quality and quantity of service.
In some cases, the danger has undoubtedly been real. But too often the
claims have been speculative or exaggerated and have masked economic
objections. 22 Such assertions have been made too frequently and too
speculatively to warrant uncritical acceptance.
Judges and antitrust policy makers may find evaluation of quality-of-care
claims difficult. They may, and should, be skeptical about them. And, as we
shall see, they may find in established doctrine no clear indication of the
relevance of such claims to antitrust analysis. At the same time, however,
quality of health care is a critical national issue. Rejection of assertions that a
successful antitrust attack on provider conduct will endanger quality of care
may place judges in the unenviable position of appearing to disregard the
public health and safety in a quest for some ill-defined economic gain to the
public through the medium of competition. The dilemma can be avoided by
stretching existing rules to conclude that the conduct in question is not
covered by the antitrust laws, or, if it is, that no violation has occurred. The
resuscitation of the Sherman Act's interstate commerce requirements in
23
hospital staff privileges cases is but one illustration of this phenomenon.
There are others.2 4 But this is not a satisfactory solution. It would not be
irrational to conclude that where conduct by health care providers otherwise
has significant adverse competitive effects in the market, justifications based
on quality-of-care concerns ought not be heard in antitrust cases and in the
formulation of antitrust doctrine. Such an approach could be justified
because of the difficulties of proof inherent in such quality assertions, the
political and social judgments they require judges to make (both in evaluating
such claims and balancing those claims against the adverse price and output
effects resulting from the restraint), and severe skepticism about them. If the
21. The theory underlying per se rules is similar. Per se rules are based on broad
generalizations about the adverse effects of particular conduct in the vast majority of cases. Cases
that are not within the generalization are thought to be rare and not worth the time and expense
their identification would require. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
50 n.16 (1977).
22. See generally Beales, supra note 17, at 134-36; Horowitz, The Economic Foundations of SelfRegulation in the Professions, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 3, 7-12 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).
Perhaps the best example was the AMA's effort to curtail group practice in the name of quality. See
American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
23. For recent examples, see Pariser v. Christian Health Care Systems, Inc., 816 F.2d 1248 (8th
Cir. 1987); Sarin v. Samaritan Health Center, 813 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1987).
24. Reliance on the state action exemption may in some cases also illustrate the phenomenon.
See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988); Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1984).
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competitive process truly threatens quality of care, then intervention through
legislative action, where a broad range of economic, social, and political
factors can be balanced, is both appropriate and available. Federal antitrust
exemptions, or state legislation carefully drawn to extend protection under
25
the "state action" exemption, could provide a vehicle for such intervention.
These considerations suggest that quality-of-care concerns should play a
limited role in the antitrust analysis employed in health care cases. They
should be taken into account in establishing an analytical framework. But
quality of care is not an irrelevant concern in all antitrust cases involving
health care. The question to be addressed is when consideration of quality
claims is relevant, and whether such claims can be evaluated in a manageable
way in particular cases.
II
QUALITY OF CARE:

A

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

To define the issues more precisely, consider the following hypothetical
case. The National College of Obstetricians certifies obstetricians as
specialists, following a series of examinations which it administers. A
physician need not have such a certification in order to practice as an
obstetrician, but it is a significant credential in the eyes of consumers,
hospitals, and insurers. About 60 percent of all obstetricians in the United
States have the certification and are members of the College. To remain
members in good standing, obstetricians must abide by a number of College
rules. Among these is a rule prohibiting any member of the College from
performing any obstetrical services in collaboration with midwives and from
serving on the staff of any hospital which extends any form of staff privileges
to midwives. Based on a careful examination of the market, a court is
prepared to conclude that the "anti-midwife" rule significantly restrains
competition. The College asserts that the rule is both intended to, and has
the effect of, improving the quality of obstetrical services and assuring the
health and safety of patients. It is prepared to offer evidence to establish that
births assisted by midwives are more dangerous to the mother and the child,
that such births carry a higher risk of deformity and brain damage, and so on.
The plaintiff has challenged the admissibility of all such evidence, asserting
that it is irrelevant in an antitrust case.
The relevance of these quality-of-care facts cannot be determined without
a more thorough understanding of the argument being advanced. A qualityof-care "defense" can mean a number of quite different things. First, the
College may seek recognition of a limited professional services exemption
from the antitrust laws. Adverse competitive effects then would have no
25.

For a recent illustration of such an exemption, see Health Care Quality Improvement Act of

1986, Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743, 3784 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.), discussed
extensively in Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 6, at 39-44, 123-28.
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antitrust consequences. 2 6 Second, the College may contend that even if the
rule in question has adverse price and output effects, those effects are offset in
some way by the social and economic benefits of avoiding deaths and physical
harm to the mother and child. Such a justification proceeds on the premise
that quality of care is a national goal to be achieved even at the cost of
competition. The argument is similar to the suggestion in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States2 7 that a restraint might be justified because it tended "to
shorten the working day."

28

Third, the College may assert that the quality-of-

care argument goes to the question of adverse competitive effect-more
specifically, that quality of care is a relevant competitive factor or that there
are no adverse price and output effects because of the preservation of a high
quality of care. For example, the College might contend that its certification
program provides the public with valuable information about physician
qualifications, that the provision of such information corrects the failure of the
market to provide adequate information to consumers, and that the midwife
rule is necessary in order to assure that the meaning of the certification is not
diluted or confused in the minds of the public.2 9 Regardless of whether this
argument has merit, it is a quite different argument from either the first or
second; it is consistent with the view that antitrust analysis is confined to an
examination of price and output effects. Fourth, the College may contend
that its rule is saved by a good purpose. In cases where violation may depend
on the presence of an anticompetitive intent, a good purpose may negate the
presence of the bad. If proof of bad purpose is critical, the evidence on
quality of care should be admissible.
The quality-of-care "defense" is thus not a single contention, but a series
of distinctly different arguments. Which argument is being advanced is likely
to depend on the facts of the particular case before the court. The relevance
of the quality impact of a particular restraint may turn on which of these
arguments is being presented. But courts confronted with quality-of-care
claims have too often failed to understand these differences. The result has
been analytical confusion, much of which can be attributed to the Supreme
Court.
A.

From Goldfarb to Indiana Federation of Dentists

Prior to the decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia
rejection of a categorical "learned professions"
laws, relatively few antitrust cases dealt directly
at all. Even fewer dealt with the more precise

State Bar Association,3 0 and its
exemption from the antitrust
with issues of product quality
question of whether conduct

26. This assumes that such an exemption would be absolute; it is hard to imagine a judicially
created exemption that would retain an equitable remedy and/or single damage remedy.
27. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
28. Id.at 241.
29. The argument assumes that a substantial segment of the public either believes that quality
obstetricians do not deal with midwives, or is somehow confused about differences between
obstetricians and midwives.
30. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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which otherwise was in violation of the antitrust laws could be legally justified
upon proof that the restraint enhanced (or prevented deterioration in)
product quality. Judicial references to quality usually took the form of
recitations that competition assured "the highest quality and the greatest
material progress." 3 1 As far back as Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 3 2 the
Supreme Court observed that "deterioration in quality ... was the inevitable

result of the monopolistic control over its production and sale." 3 3 Quality is
therefore dependent upon competition, and impairments of competition are
inconsistent with the attainment of product excellence. That a truly
anticompetitive restraint might promote product quality seems inconsistent
with these simple (and powerful) propositions. Discussions of joint
ventures34 and product standardization agreements 35 make occasional
references to quality, with little effort at definition or precision. Judicial
analysis of quality-of-care justifications, therefore, has tended to focus in
precedential terms on recent cases dealing directly with the professions.
These decisions, however, have engendered confusion and left a good many
questions unanswered.
This confusion began with the Supreme Court's decision in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar Association,36 which found that the use of recommended fee
schedules by the Fairfax County (Virginia) Bar Association violated section 1
of the Sherman Act. The Court rejected the contention that the "learned
professions" were not engaged in "trade or commerce" and were not
therefore covered by the Sherman Act, noting that "the public service aspect
of professional practice [is not] controlling in determining whether § 1
includes professions."- 37 While Goldfarb dealt specifically with lawyers, it
opened the door for the application of the antitrust laws to a wide variety of
restraints involving health care markets. But in a now well-known footnote,
inserted perhaps out of an abundance of caution, the Court sowed the seeds
for the confusion about the relevance of quality-of-care concerns. The
footnote states:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically apply to the
professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,

31. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
32. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
33. Id. at 52.
34. For example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984), the Court noted that a
number of the NCAA's rules concerning collegiate football were a reasonable and necessary means
to assure the "quality" and "integrity" of the product.
35. See, e.g., Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore.
1966), aff 'dpercuriam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
36. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
37. Id. at 787.
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which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context,
38
be treated differently ....

So the antitrust laws apply to the professions, but not quite. This footnote,
referred to repeatedly in lower court health care cases, could have any one of
several meanings. First, there might be a limited exclusion or exemption for
professional activity, in order to preserve its "public service" aspects.3 9
Second, those public service aspects might be thought to outweigh adverse
competitive effects. Courts would need to balance price and output effects
against social gains. 40 Third, the first sentence might be taken to mean that
markets for professional services are characterized by market forces or failures
that differ from those of the other markets. 4 1 Analysis of price and output
effects must take such differences into account.
Goldfarb was followed by the decision in National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States.42 The canons of ethics of the Society prohibited
competitive bidding. This, according to the government, was tantamount to
price-fixing. In defense, the Society asserted that the prohibition was
necessary because competitive bidding would result in "inferior work with
consequent risk to public safety and health," 43 a contention contrary to the
repeated earlier assertions by the Court, noted above, that it is competition
which assures quality. The Court's conclusion in ProfessionalEngineers that the
Society's ban on competitive bidding could not be justified on quality-ofservice grounds is hardly surprising. The Society was contending that harm
to public safety was the necessary result of competition, and that purchasers
of engineering services were best served if critical information, the price of
such services, was withheld from them for some period of time. Both
assertions squarely contradict the assumptions about the competitive model
long relied upon in the formulation of antitrust policy. It is the competitive
process, and not its absence, which promotes quality. Competition and
38. Id. at 788 n. 17. Footnote 17 has been the subject of a great deal of commentary. See, e.g.,
Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health Professions: Developing a Framework for Assessing
Private Restraints, 34 VAND. L. REV. 927, 934-39 (1981); Elzinga, The Compass of Competition for
Professional Services, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 107, 116-18 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).
39.

See Kissam, supra note 11, at 148.

40. See Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., Inc., 789 F.2d 278, 282 n.14 (4th Cir. 1986);
Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977);
Comment, The Professions and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se Rules Under the Sherman Act,
11 U. MiCH. J.L. REF. 387 (1978).
41. This now appears to be the prevailing interpretation, but only in light of National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 6;
Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and
Refining the Rule of Reason, 27 UCLA L. REV. 265, 322-26 (1979). It has been suggested that the
differences between professional and other markets noted in Goldfarb make it inappropriate to apply
per se rules (or at least the per se rule applicable to boycotts) to professional activity. See, e.g.,
Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Wilk v.
American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984); Kissam,
Antitrust Law and Professional Behavior, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1983). But compare Weiss v. York
Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984). Judicial departure from traditional boycott rules in health care
cases is likely to gain additional impetus from the decision in FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447 (1986). See infra text at note 73.
42. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
43. Id. at 693.
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therefore quality require knowledge on the part of buyers, who cannot make
appropriate choices without it. Professional Engineers makes clear that antitrust
rules are directed solely to the competitive effects of the restraint, a significant
reformulation of the vague rule of reason standards set forth in Chicago Board
44
of Trade v. United States.
On its face, Professional Engineers appears to eliminate quality-of-care
"defenses" predicated either on a continuing limited antitrust exemption or
on the offsetting of competitive harms against social benefits. Indeed, the
Court specifically noted that the "judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public
against this harm [defective products that may cause injury] by conferring
monopoly privileges on the manufacturers." 45 But the Court went on:
We adhere to the view expressed in Goldfarb that, by their nature, professional services
may differ significantly from other business services, and, accordingly, the nature of

the competition in such services may vary. Ethical norms may serve
to regulate and
4 6
promote this competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason.

While verbally adhering to the Goldfarb footnote, this reservation is more
precise. Rather than public service, the touchstone is the nature of the
competition. If professional services differ from others, the differences are in
the markets themselves. Evaluation of competitive effects must take such
differences into account. While the Court does not explain how such markets
differ, its discussion of the Engineers' prohibition on competitive bidding is
illuminating. The Court recast the justification advanced as an argument that
competitive bidding would result in deceptively low bids, noting that an
ethical canon targeted only at deception might be legitimate. It was not,
however, prepared to equate competition with deception. The Court's
willingness to permit self-regulation narrowly focused on deception suggests
at least one way in which professional services markets might differ from
others-namely, that in such markets consumers are likely to lack information
and find it difficult to evaluate the information they do have. Deception might
be both more common and more effective in such markets. Widespread
deception is an indicator of market failure. Conduct which averts such failure,
and does nothing more, is procompetitive. Thus while the Court in
Professional Engineers recognizes the Goldfarb reservation, its single-minded
emphasis on competitive effects works a substantial reformulation of the
Goldfarb footnote. There is no suggestion in ProfessionalEngineers that there is
a limited exemption for anticompetitive professional activities. Nor is there any
indication that their adverse economic effects are to be balanced against social
gains.
Neither Goldfarb nor Professional Engineers deals directly with health care
markets. Their references to differences between professional services
markets and others, and to the public service aspects of professional life,
44. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). To the extent that Chicago Board of Trade seems to suggest that inquiry
under the rule of reason encompasses more than adverse competitive effects, ProfessionalEngineers is a
significant reformulation of the standard.
45. 435 U.S. at 695-96.
46. Id. at 696.
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cannot be taken as identification of structures and market forces peculiar to
the provision of health care. In particular, these decisions make no reference
to two features of health care markets thought by some to differentiate such
markets from virtually all others: the prevalence of third party payment and
the central role of providers, rather than consumers, in determining the
nature and level of services to be provided. Markets for legal and engineering
services are much more normal in these respects. The characteristic common
to all professional markets is the difficulty that consumers confront in
obtaining and evaluating adequate information upon which to make informed
decisions. Some professional self-regulation facilitates the availability of
accurate information and the preservation of free choice. 4 7 The reservations
about the application of the antitrust laws to the professions in Goldfarb and
ProfessionalEngineers might well be viewed as suggesting little more than that
self-regulation serving this limited purpose should not be impaired by the
antitrust laws.
Although Goldfarb and Professional Engineers do not address health care
markets directly, they have set the boundaries within which courts have dealt
with quality-of-care issues. At the most extreme boundary, Professional
Engineers can be read to preclude any direct consideration of quality-of-care
effects. 4 8 At the other, Goldfarb has seemed to some to suggest that
professions enjoy a limited antitrust exemption, or at least that adverse
competitive effects must be balanced against non-economic social gains
whenever professional activities are found to serve "public service" ends. 49
While both of these interpretations are overly broad, the area in between
these extremes still affords ample ground for disagreement.
The Supreme Court's trilogy of health care antitrust cases following
Goldfarb-Aizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 50 Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde, 5 1 and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists 52 -leaves little
doubt about the general applicability of the antitrust laws to health care
activities and considerable doubt about how they are to be applied. While
47. Professional self-regulation may be taken to include both professional standard setting
through such activities as accreditation and credentialing programs, and the enforcement of
professional and ethical standards through the use of sanctions directed at members of the
profession (e.g., sanctions imposed on an attorney who engages in ambulance chasing) or, in some
cases, third parties whose conduct is thought inimical to the interests of the profession (e.g., an
ethical rule precluding physicians from associating with chiropractors). Standard setting often is
procompetitive precisely because it provides information and reduces information search costs. See
generally Havighurst & King, supra note 11, at 173-84; Kissam, Government Policy Toward Medical
Accreditation and Certification: The Antitrust Laws and Other Procompetitive Strategies, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1.
Professional self-regulation that involves sanctions imposed by the profession itself poses greater
competitive risks, but may in some cases also have procompetitive information effects. See, e.g.,
Kissam, supra note 11, at 145.
48. See generally 7 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw
1504 (1986), although Professor Areeda
expresses doubt that "the Court meant to go so far as to condemn a restraint that actually saves
lives." Id. at 381.
49. See supra notes 39, 40.
50. 457 U.S. 332 (1981).
51. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
52. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
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Goldfarb's reservations about professional services have been expressed in
varying ways in each of these cases, the Court has proceeded analytically as
though health care markets differ little from others. Only Indiana Federationof
Dentists deals directly with quality of care.
The issue in Maricopa was whether conduct characterized by the Court as
an agreement among competing physicians to fix the maximum prices to be
claimed as full payment from insurers was per se unlawful under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. The Court's holding that a per se rule applied did not deal
directly with the impact of the challenged conduct on the quality of care
provided; the Court simply observed that defendants did not argue that the
restraint enhanced quality. But much of the analysis bears on quality issues.
The Court reaffirmed the reservation expressed in both Goldfarb and
Professional Engineers concerning the application of the antitrust laws to
professional conduct. It reverted back to the "public service aspect, and other
features of the professions" formulation of Goldfarb, which it quoted
directly. 53 While citing Professional Engineers for the same point, the Court
apparently perceived no difference between the two. It then put a further
gloss on Goldfarb by finding that because the restraint in question was "not
premised on public service or ethical norms" 54 its reservation did not apply. In
Professional Engineers, where the Court also spoke of "ethical norms," it
suggested that such norms might be lawful where they promote
competition. 55 The meaning of this suggestion is unclear. The implication is
that public service and ethical norms are different, and that professional
activity in either category might warrant non-conventional analysis. The
Court's rather offhand reference to quality of care in this context raises a
number of unanswered questions. Is quality relevant only when the conduct
in question is a form of public service or in conformity with ethical norms? Is
improvement in quality to be equated with public service? Do the Court's
observations apply only to the relevance of quality-of-care contentions that
would not be relevant under conventional antitrust analysis?
Finally, and most important, the Court showed impatience with
contentions that a per se rule should not apply because health care markets
possess characteristics not found in other markets. The observation by Justice
Powell in dissent that in health care markets the consumer "has no ready way
of comparing physicians or of 'shopping' for quality medical services," and his
conclusion that the "perfect model" analysis of antitrust therefore provides
little guidance, 5 6 was dismissed with the assertion that the rationale
underlying per se rules is inconsistent with the need to "rejustify" such rules
on an industry-by-industry basis. 5 7 Where many analysts find a significant
difference between health care markets and others-a difference of direct
53.
54.
55.
56.

57.

457 U.S. at 348.
Id. at 349.
435 U.S. at 699.
457 U.S. at 366 n.13.
Id. at 351.
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relevance in any evaluation of competitive effects-the Court found none.
For the purposes of the per se rule at issue in Maricopa, health care markets
were the same as any other.
The Court returned briefly to the quality-of-care issue in Hyde58 (though
once again the defendant did not formally seek to justify its conduct on quality
grounds). The defendant hospital had denied hospital staff privileges to the
plaintiff/anesthesiologist because it was party to a contract granting the
exclusive right to provide anesthesiological services to another. The Court
concluded after an extensive discussion of the standards governing tying
agreements that the arrangements did not violate the antitrust laws because
the hospital lacked market power. The finding of a lack of market power is of
some consequence. Plaintiff contended, and the court of appeals had agreed,
that even though defendant hospital's market share was relatively low, there
were "imperfections" in the market which indicated that defendant's market
power was significantly greater than its market share suggested. The
imperfections alleged, not surprisingly, were the prevalence of third party
payment, and the unavailability to consumers of adequate information. The
Court found such imperfections irrelevant in determining whether patients
were "forced" to make purchases they would not otherwise have made. 59
Thus, in both Maricopa and Hyde, the Court found the market imperfections
often relied upon to resist application of the competitive model to health care
markets irrelevant to the dispute before it. But its recognition that these
imperfections "may generate 'market power' in some abstract sense '

60

is

significant. Provider or insurer conduct that does nothing more than reduce
or eliminate such imperfections, and thus reduces market power, is
procompetitive and should be treated as lawful.
In footnotes, the court made further specific reference to quality of care.
In the first, the Court noted that absent evidence that defendant was using
market power to force a choice upon consumers, the arrangement was lawful
whatever its purpose. 6 ' This is an unexceptionable but important point.
Conduct without adverse price and output effects need not be justified at all.
In the second footnote, the Court declined to consider a series of
"procompetitive" justifications, concurring with the lower court that because
there was no showing that these effects could not be achieved in a less
restrictive way, they could not be used to defend the restraint at issue. 62 The
"less restrictive alternative" analysis is again relatively conventional 6 3 and not
58. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
59. Id. at 27.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 25 n.41.
62. Id. at 25 n.42. In yet a third footnote, the Court observed that while there was little evidence
on the quality effect of the exclusive arrangement at issue, "the self-interest of the hospital, as well as
the ethical and professional norms under which it operates, presumably protect the quality of
anesthesiological services." Id. at 31 n.52. While the reference to ethical norms creates some
ambiguity, the Court seems to be asserting simply that competitive pressures on the hospital will
assure quality.
63. See infra text at notes 169-70.
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confined to health care cases, but recognition of the need to evaluate
alternatives to the end of quality improvement serves as a significant
limitation on the utility of a quality-of-care defense.
Justice O'Connor concurred separately, urging the use of the rule of
reason, with its inquiry into both "adverse economic effects, and the potential
economic benefits" in tying cases. 64 She specifically found that the
arrangement in question "improves patient care and permits more efficient
hospital operation" by assuring twenty-four-hour coverage, standardizing
procedures and making more efficient use of equipment, and permitting the
hospital "more effectively to monitor the quality" of service. 6 5 Her
conclusion that "[siuch an arrangement, that has little anticompetitive effect
and achieves substantial benefits in the provision of care to patients, is hardly
one that the antitrust law should condemn,"' 66 may appear to lend support to

a broad quality-of-care defense under which gains in quality are offset against
adverse price and output effects. This would be a misreading. First, she
clearly is speaking of economic benefits, not social benefits that cannot be put
in economic terms. Second, these economic benefits are in the form of
increased efficiency. Improvement in patient care may occur, but only
because resources are more efficiently employed. The assessment of such
efficiencies is consistent with the consumer welfare model of antitrust, and
67
involves no peculiar "patient care" defense.
The final case in the trilogy is Indiana Federation of Dentists,68 where
protection of the quality of dental care was the primary justification offered by
defendants. At issue was a collective refusal by Indiana dentists, through the
Indiana Federation, to supply x-rays along with claim forms to a number of
dental care insurers. In order to contain dental care cost, insurers operated
under policies limiting payments to the cost of the "least expensive yet
adequate treatment," and often insisted that patient x-rays be submitted as
part of the claims review process. 69 After the Indiana Dental Association, the
primary professional organization in the state, consented to a Federal Trade
Commission order directing the Association to cease efforts to prevent
submission of x-rays by member dentists, a group of dentists formed the
Federation for the purpose of continuing resistance to insurers' demands.
The Federal Trade Commission held that the collective refusal to supply xrays by the Federation was in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 70 During the FTC proceeding, the Federation attempted to
justify its action on quality-of-care grounds, asserting that because x-rays
alone do not furnish an adequate basis for evaluating dental problems,
insurers who rely solely on x-rays would decline to pay for treatment which
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

466 U.S. at 35.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
See infra text at notes 80-83.
476 U.S. 447 (1986).
Id. at 449.
38 Stat. 719, as amended 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 ed. & Supp. II).
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was in the best interest of the patient. The Commission found no evidence to
7

support this assertion. '
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the
evidence of anticompetitive effect insufficient to support the Commission's
order. The court was not persuaded that the conduct had any impact on
competition among dentists. It repeatedly described the Federation's conduct

as adherence "to a legal, moral, and ethical policy of quality and proper
72

dental care."The Supreme Court sustained the Commission's order. The Court
declined to apply a per se rule, noting, inter alia, that "we have been slow to
' 73
condemn rules adopted by professional associations as reasonable per se,
but found that the Commission's findings of anticompetitive effects were
sufficient. The Court observed, referring to Professional Engineers, that
withholding or increasing the cost of information desired by consumers in
making purchase decisions "may be condemned even absent proof that it
resulted in higher prices." 74 Indeed, even if the information were useless in
making informed choices, the Federation would not be entitled to make this
decision on behalf of its customers.
Having satisfied itself that the Commission could legitimately have found
adverse competitive effects, the Court specifically addressed the quality-ofcare justification put forward by the Federation. The court of appeals had
equated quality of care with "consumer welfare," employing the phrase used
by the Chicago School to describe an antitrust policy focused solely on
allocative and productive efficiency. 75 In sharp contrast, the Supreme Court
characterized the proffered justifications as "noneconomic," and rejected
them. The Federation's argument was reduced to the proposition that in a
free market with access to information consumers deemed relevant, they
71. 476 U.S. at 452.
72. 745 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1984). The court concluded as follows:
In effect, the Commission's finding of a Federal antitrust violation, based upon the
insufficient evidence submitted in this case, is a rubber-stamp approval of the group dental
health insurers' practice to formulate a course of dental treatment based solely upon dental
x-rays and an insurance claim form, in violation of established, accepted and approved
standards of quality dental care. There is no doubt that judicial sanction of such a practice,
under the guise of the Federal Trade Commission Act, runs counter to public policy and the
very purpose of the Federal antitrust laws as a consumer welfare prescription. Indeed, by
preventing dentists from joining together to promote standards of quality dental care that
comport with the American Dental Association's code of professional conduct and the
Indiana dental code, the Commission, with absolutely no expertise or training in the highly
advanced field of dentistry, universally regulates the dental profession and all of its
specialties . . to the detriment of consumers. The group dental health care insurers cannot
be permitted to forsake standards of quality and proper dental care in an attempt to lower
their dental costs, particularly in the instant case where there has been no finding that the
review of dental x-rays alone, actually reduces dental costs.
Id. at 1144. The relevance of this passage, which seems directed primarily at the conduct of insurers,
is not clear. Nor was it necessary, since the court had already concluded that there was insufficient
evidence of anticompetitive effect. But it is highly revealing with respect to the attitude of the court.
73. 476 U.S. at 458.
74. Id.at 462.
75. See infra text at note 80.
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would make "unwise and even dangerous choices;" ' 76 this was precisely the
argument rejected in Professional Engineers. There was no reason to believe
that the information withheld (x-rays) would be more harmful to consumers in
the dental service market than similar information in other markets. True,
insurers who make payment decisions are not the ones using the services, but
since insurers compete among themselves, they also have incentives to
consider the patient's welfare. If their plans do not satisfy dental needs, those
purchasing insurance coverage will turn elsewhere. Finally, the Court noted
that the Commission had considered the quality-of-care evidence submitted
and justifiably found it insufficient. In a footnote which dentists have
undoubtedly found particularly disturbing, the Court added, "There is little
basis for concluding that, where such a divergence of professional judgment
exists, the treatment recommendation made by the patient's dentist should be
assumed to be the one that in fact represents the best interests of the
77
patient."
Indiana Federation of Dentists is an information case, just as was Professional
Engineers. In both cases, the quality-of-care argument made was little more
than the following: Given the information previously withheld, consumers
would make choices reflecting cost/quality tradeoffs that would be harmful to
them. Unlike the court of appeals, the Court was simply unprepared to
assume that patients and insurers were incapable of making correct decisions.
Of some note, the Court's discussion of quality of care makes no mention of
Goldfarb's reservations about applying the antitrust laws to professional
conduct. The decision gives little comfort to those urging that antitrust
analysis in health care markets should take into account a variety of noneconomic factors.
Can the quality-of-care strands taken from Goldfarb through Indiana
Federation of Dentists be woven into a coherent whole? The questions are being
narrowed, and the nature of inquiry is now more sharply focused. A clear
pattern is emerging. First, and most obvious, the Supreme Court has never
found professional activity having adverse price and output effects justified by
concerns over the quality of service provided. Second, justifications based on
the view that competition will necessarily result in quality deterioration are
unacceptable. This is the central point in both Professional Engineers and
Indiana Federation of Dentists. Third, restraints that take the form of
withholding information that consumers might deem relevant to the
cost/quality tradeoffs involved in purchase decisions are both anticompetitive
and unjustified, with the exception, perhaps, of information that is in most
cases likely to deceive, or that is too easily abused in a deceitful way. Even in
the latter case, however, the restraint may be upheld only if there is no less
76.

476 U.S.

at 463.

77. Id. at 464 n.4. Professor Kissam has observed, "[tihe Court also has become increasingly
skeptical about the scope and validity of professional claims." Kissam, supra note 41, at 19. Nowhere
is this more apparent than in this footnote, which goes counter to the oft-repeated view of health care
providers that in the fact of uncertainty "the doctor knows best." There is no deference to
professional judgment here.
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restrictive means available for dealing effectively with the problem of
deception. Conversely, where consumers lack the information upon which to
make such judgments, a restraint that enhances the availability of information,
and thus reduces an element of "market imperfection" (the description in
Hyde), might to that extent be viewed as procompetitive.
The Court has been less tolerant of other market failure arguments. While
the prevalence of third party payment and the role of providers in
determining the level and quality of service have been noted, the Court has
not found such failure or imperfections relevant in the cases before it. In both
Maricopa and Hyde, arguments based on these factors were rejected. The
Court in this sense has treated health care markets like most others.
These conclusions are consistent with the basic premise that quality is
enhanced through the competitive process, where consumers make
quality/cost tradeoffs through informed choice among a variety of goods and
services. Conduct that simply eliminates market failures, or that through the
creation of efficiencies results in delivering the same services at a lower cost, is
procompetitive. The Court's repeated assertions that professional conduct,
and conduct in health care markets in particular, should be evaluated under
standards that differ significantly from those more generally applied has
created confusion. The Court's reservations about professional activity have
not been expressed in a consistent manner. As already noted, Goldfarb and
Maricopa can be read to suggest that some limited professional exemption may
exist, or that courts should somehow balance social gains against economic
harms. Conversely, Professional Engineers suggests only that the nature of
competition in professional services markets may be different, and thus
requires more careful analysis. Its reference to ethical norms is in the context
of promoting competition, and indicates only that norms having such an effect
might not be governed by per se rules. These imprecise references to public
service and ethical norms have allowed lower courts to treat quality-of-care
issues in a variety of inconsistent ways, and in a manner reflecting biases more
than consistent principles of antitrust analysis. Focus on public service and
ethical norms diverts attention from economic analysis. It leads to an
emphasis on the tradition of self-regulation, without regard to the ends such
self-regulation should serve, and thus becomes a vehicle for maintaining the
status quo.
Despite the confusion caused by the Goldfarb footnote and its progeny, the
Court in its health care cases is generally moving in a direction in which
quality of care is simply a factor in the analysis of adverse competitive effects.
Here, as elsewhere, the Court has applied a consumer welfare standard
focused directly on price and output effects. 7 8 Only the reservations about
78. Beginning with its decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania hn.. 433 U.S. 16
(1977), the Supreme Court has moved steadily in the direction of an antitrust policy based 11pon
economic analysis and focused primarily, if not exclusively, on price and output cllcts. Ser. e.g..
Matsushita Elec, Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); National (ollegiatc .\tlclu
Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Broadcast Music. loc. v. Coltunbia
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professional activity expressed in Goldfarb are inconsistent with this view.
Market structures and forces may be different in health care markets, and
these differences may be relevant in evaluating the price and output effects of
particular conduct, but the antitrust principles applied remain the same. The
critical questions for the future, then, are whether and how quality of care is
relevant in the economic analysis of restraints in markets for professional
services, and whether antitrust analysis should give weight to quality-of-care
factors beyond their relevance in such economic terms.
B.

The Appropriate Analysis of the Quality-of-Care Defense

The preoccupation with quality of care in the antitrust analysis of conduct
in health care markets may leave the impression that the quality of products
and services has no relevance in antitrust analysis generally. This is not the
case. It would be more accurate to say that antitrust recognizes no single
quality defense. Quality has been, and is, of direct relevance in a variety of
ways. It is the thesis of this study that no special consideration of quality
beyond that which antitrust currently contemplates is either necessary or
appropriate; contemporary antitrust standards should be applied without
special treatment for professionals in general and health care professionals in
particular. This is not to say that concerns over quality of care or, more likely,
equal access to adequate care, could not cause policy makers to modify
competitive outcomes through enactment of federal antitrust exemptions or
state legislation sufficient to invoke the state action exemption. However, the
political, social, and economic policy judgments such action requires are more
appropriate for legislatures than courts. 79 Tort rules governing malpractice
and other quality abuses also continue to provide quality-of-care incentives.
There is no quality-of-care defense in antitrust cases; nor should there be.
1.

Quality of Care As a Factor in Consumer Welfare Analysis.

a. The general approach. If professional activity receives no special
dispensation, how is quality of care relevant in antitrust cases? I assume
initially that antitrust is focused solely on allocative and productive efficiency,
and that a variety of other economic, social, and political concerns (ranging
from income distribution to the preservation of small business) are not
relevant.8~ 1 Antitrust intervention should occur only when conduct raises
price and restricts output, or is likely to do so."' The questions addressed are
economic, and economic analysis governs outcomes. Whether antitrust is, or
Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See generally Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The
(NVear) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 319.
79. See R. BORK, supra note 14, at 82-84.
80. This is the "consumer welfare" standard of the so-called Chicago School, a view which
presently dominates in antitrust policy making. For general expressions of this view, see R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1976); R. BORK, supra note 14, at 51-115; Gerhard,
supra note 78, at 320-22. See generally Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979).
81. See R. BORK, supra note 14, at 116-33.
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should be, so limited in its outlook is a hotly contested proposition.8 2 But
prevailing antitrust standards are largely in accord with this "consumer
welfare" model. 8 3 The discussion that follows begins with consideration of
price and output effects.
Quality as such is an indeterminate fact, in most cases. Consumer
perceptions of quality vary, as do the quality/cost tradeoffs consumers make
every day. This is true in most health care markets, even though some may
aspire to a universal standard of best or adequate care. Even if such a
standard existed, there would be little agreement over whether it has been
satisfied. Medical procedures are the subject of considerable professional
disagreement. Scientific knowledge may well be inconclusive. In many cases,
even the minimum safety standards are elusive. A given treatment may be
safe for some, and not for others. Even a very high risk procedure-a
procedure most would deem unsafe-may represent the best quality to one
who is terminally ill. The legal standard employed in malpractice and other
tort liability cases, the duty to exercise reasonable care, reflects this difficulty
of absolute definition, but is inadequate as a standard against which to
measure conduct that allegedly violates the antitrust laws. The definition and
identification of quality is surely no more possible in health care markets than
84
in others.
Quality, then, is not an absolute. It is the result of a competitive process in
which consumers have choices, and which provides incentives to producers to
improve goods and services in ways that make them more saleable. Quality is
a result of the competitive process. This has been a central point in antitrust
analysis for decades.8 5 Economic analysis starts with the same basic
premise.8 6 There is in most cases a fundamental contradiction in the
argument that quality can be enhanced through restraints among producers
(providers) that significantly restrain the competitive process and result in
adverse price and output effects.
Several caveats to these broad propositions are necessary. In theory, an
agreement among providers to improve quality without employment of any
additional resources is an increase in output, assuming that the agreement
82.

I have described the debate over antitrust's goals elsewhere. See Kauper, The Goals of United

States Antitrust Policy-the Current Debate, in 136 ZEITSCHRIFr F R DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT'

408 (1980) (article in English). See also Kauper, Comment: The Sullivan Approach to Horizontal Restraints,
75 CALIF. L. REv. 893, 896-901 (1987). The debate over goals continues. Compare Easterbrook,
Comparative Advantage and Antitrust Law, 75 CALIF L. REV. 983 (1987); Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust
Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1700-02 (1986), and Baxter, Responding to the Reaction: The Draftsman's
View, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 618, 619-21 (1983), with Sullivan, AnticipatingAntitrust's Centennial: The Viability
of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 835, 838-41 (1987); Fox, Consumer Beware
Chicago, 84 MicH. L. REV. 1714, 1718-19 (1986); Fox, The Modernization ofAntitrust: A New Equilibrium,
66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1146-55 (1981).
83. See supra note 78.
84. At a bare minimum, quality of medical care is no easier to define than quality with respect to
any other service or product. Compare Beales, supra note 17, at 126-32, with Elzinga, supra note 38, at
108-09.
85. See supra text at notes 31-33.
86. For a strong statement of the classic view, see Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d
922, (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
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brings no increase in price. Similarly, an agreement that results in a lowering
of quality without a lowering of prices or change in the resources employed
may be characterized as a restriction of output, and should be condemned as
such. 8 7 This has been implicitly recognized in antitrust cases in which
defendants have contended that they should be absolved because their
88
conduct did not raise prices, restrict output, or lower the quality of the product.
But these theoretical principles are of little utility in antitrust analysis. Quality
changes cannot normally be measured. It is unlikely that they can even be
characterized as good or bad. It may be impossible to determine whether
other price and output effects accompany quality changes. Agreements to
improve quality may mask agreements to eliminate lower cost alternatives
which provide significant price competition to those asserting that such
alternatives are of lower quality. 89 In the long run, consumer choice is
reduced and disincentives to further improvement in quality may be created.
To illustrate, suppose that a professional association of dentists agrees
that its members will not use substance X in the filling of teeth because, in the
collective judgment of its members, fillings made of that substance will not
last as long as fillings made of other substances. Use of substance X by a
member will result in expulsion from the association. Assuming that
durability is the sole difference between substance X and others, quality
appears to be enhanced. If substance X is the same price as others, and its use
involves all the same costs, the net effect of the agreement might be an
increase in quality and nothing more. But this is an unreal scenario. The very
fact that the association comes to an agreement on this point suggests that the
material is a competitive factor. Dentists informed of the quality difference
would presumably opt not to use substance X even without agreement by
others (and the association could provide such information without adoption
of mandatory standards), unless something more is involved. 90 Further
analysis shows the following. There is disagreement over the durability not
only of substance X, but other substances as well. A tooth filled with
substance X appears different, because substance X is closer to the natural
color of teeth. Some consumers prefer substance X as a cosmetic matter.
And while the cost of substance X is the same as other filling substances, some
dentists with recent training can use it more efficiently. A number of younger
dentists have advertised the material as a lower-cost, more cosmetically
appealing alternative. With these added facts, which are likely to be present
in an antitrust case, the dilemma is clear. A lower-priced alternative which
some consumers prefer has been eliminated to serve a collective quality
judgment about which there is a professional disagreement. Assuming that
87. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 14, at 35.
88. For example, respondents in Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941), contended that their boycott of stores selling designs of fashion pirates was lawful because it
did not effect prices or output, and did not work "a deterioration in quality." Id. at 466.
89. For a good illustration, see 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 48, at 386 n.10.
90. Conceivably, a number of dentists use substance X without informing patients of its
shortcomings in order to gain business refilling teeth at an earlier date; this is essentially a deception.
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adverse price effects are significant, and that consumers have relevant
information, antitrust should opt for the free market solution.
A second caveat to the broad proposition that the competitive process
assures the appropriate quality/price mix should also be noted. If
competitors enter into an agreement to fix prices, quality may actually
improve. Participants will continue to have incentives to compete and cheat
on the cartel. Because of the price benefits accruing to the cartel, its members
may seek ways to compete without violating the cartel agreement and thus
causing it to break down. Quality competition may take the place of
competition in terms of price, and product quality may be improved as a
result. 9 1 The range of consumer product choices might actually increase. If
improvement of quality is our sole concern, cartels might be justified on such
grounds. But quality is not the only concern. In this case, quality
improvement comes at the cost of the elimination of price competition, which
results in higher prices. Consumers desiring lower quality at a lesser price are
deprived of that choice. Moreover, while we may be relatively confident that
the cartel will cause restricted output and higher prices, there is no assurance
that quality will actually improve. 9 2 Even if firms cheat, they may do so
93
through product differentiation or other more wasteful forms of rivalry.
The fact that a cartel might result in quality improvement (or prevent quality
deterioration) has never been accepted as a ground for softening antitrust's
harsh treatment of cartels, and there is no reason why it should.
These principles are directly applicable to cartel behavior in health care
markets. If a group of physicians enters into an agreement to fix the prices to
their patients, or to establish the rate they will accept as full reimbursement
from insurers, they ought not be permitted to defend their actions by
asserting that quality will be enhanced. Absent some true efficiency or a
relevant market failure (discussed below), conventional cartel rules should
94
apply. This is, in essence, the holding of the Court in ProfessionalEngineers.
The two caveats just expressed-an increase in quality may be an increase
in output, and quality competition might increase among cartel membersare not sufficient to alter the basic starting premise that quality is best
91. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 115-16 (2d ed. 1981).
92. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 1 311 (3d ed. 1981). For the argument that monopoly
power in physicians will result in a lessening of quality see Sloan & Feldman, Competition among
Physicians, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR 45, 66-68 (W. Greenberg ed. 1978).

93. A variation of this scenario is found in the current debate over the quality of services and
safety effects of airline deregulation. Critics assert that competition forces a deterioration in quality
because competition forces airlines to cut corners. Higher revenues, which might be assured
through reestablishment of a government sponsored cartel, will permit firms to expend more on
quality control, aircraft maintenance, pilot training, and so on. But there are serious flaws in the
argument. Even with a cartel, less efficient producers may still be tempted to cut corners. There is
therefore no assurance of higher quality. Firms may simply opt for higher profits or compete by
dispensation of free liquor (or something similar). Public safety regulation may more effectively
assure the public against harm, without the extraction of monopoly profits and elimination of the
public's ability to choose a lower-priced alternative. If the public's ability to choose is constrained by
the presence of a monopoly seller, or by inadequacy of information, these market imperfections or
failures should be addressed directly.
94. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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determined and assured through the competitive process. Given this premise,
justifications for provider conduct based upon quality-of-care considerations
are relevant when: (1) the conduct ameliorates market failures or
imperfections that prevent the market from functioning properly; or (2) the
conduct permits providers to deliver services more efficiently; or (3) the
enhancement of quality permits providers more effectively to compete with
others. Where the determination of competitive effects turns upon the
intention with which the alleged violators acted, the intention to increase
quality (or prevent its debasement) may also be relevant (although in an
antitrust policy predicated on an economic analysis of price and output
effects, intent will seldom be a determining factor). In none of these cases are
we speaking of a broad quality-of-care defense. Rather, the focus should be
on factors commonly examined in all antitrust analysis: market failure,
efficiency creation, competitiveness, and, to some extent, intent. Each of
these factors will be considered in turn.
b.

Marketfailure and quality of care in health care markets.

Discussion of the

appropriate role of competition, and therefore of the antitrust laws, in health

care markets invariably turns to market failures or imperfections. 9 5
Opponents of competition-based reform are quick to assert that health care
markets do not, and cannot, function in a manner consistent with the
competitive model, and that the interjection of competition will not only fail
to bring optimal results in terms of price, output, and quality but may make
matters even less optimal than alternative structures. 9 6 Health care markets
are said to differ from others in several critical ways. The prevalence of third
party payment removes cost as a factor in the consumer's decisions about
quality/cost tradeoffs. Moreover, consumers do not know what services they
need and do not determine who should provide them; these determinations
are made by providers themselves. Consumers lack the information, and the
ability to evaluate the information, to make informed choices. Because
consumers are unconcerned about price and cannot evaluate either the need
for or quality of service, a market based upon the competitive model will fail
to allocate resources in the most efficient way. 9 7 It can be argued that the
patchwork of state and federal regulatory interventions in health care markets
virtually assures that policies directed toward the interjection of competition
95. See, e.g., Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941
(1963); Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 3, at 867-70; Bovbjerg, supra note 17, at 967-73; Marmor,
Broer & Greenberg, Medical Care and Procompetitve Reform, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1003, at 1008-06 (1981);
Pauly, Is Medical Care Diferent?, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR 11 (W. Greenberg ed.
1978); Weingast, Physicians, DNA Research Scientists, and the Market for Lemons, in REGULATING THE
PROFESSIONS 81 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980). Compare Elzinga, supra note 38, at 108-09.
96. This has been the primary economic argument advanced to support both extensive
professional self-regulation and government intervention in health care markets. See Blumstein &
Sloan, supra note 3, at 870; Beales, supra note 17, at 125-27; Horowitz, supra note 22.
97. These elements of market "failure" are commonplace in debates over the appropriate public
policy with respect to health care. See Havighurst, Competition in Health Services: Overview, Issues and
Answers, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1981).
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"in the gaps" will accomplish little, and may be counterproductive. 9 8
Wholesale dismantling of extant regulatory systems, which might solve this
problem, may be politically impossible. 99
Whether these factors require health care structures based on something
other than the competitive model is a question beyond the scope of this study,
which is focused not on whether the antitrust laws should apply but on how
they should apply. At present the question whether the antitrust laws should
apply at all has been resolved, but each of these factors may be relevant in the
antitrust analysis applied in particular cases. The evaluation of price and
output effects cannot ignore third party payment, a highly relevant economic
fact. And because the ability of the market to assure optimal quality/cost
tradeoffs depends upon the ability to make informed choices, impediments to
such choices are directly relevant to the evaluation of quality-of-care
considerations. Whether the particular conduct at issue in a given antitrust
case is anticompetitive in the consumer welfare sense may depend upon the
relationship between such conduct and the imperfections present in the
market. In some cases, quality/cost tradeoffs may be optimized through
conduct that removes such imperfections.
The relevance of third party payment on a fee-for-service basis to the
quality of health care is not obvious. Consumers not constrained by limited
resources, and therefore unconcerned about cost, will elect the best care
available, to the extent they make choices at all. Similarly, where demand is
determined by providers, as is often the case, there is no reason to believe
that third party payment is a factor in limiting the quality of care provided.
Unconstrained by considerations of cost, doctors and other providers are
likely to opt for more and better services, not less. The prevalence of fee-forservice payment by insurers or the government has been justly criticized on
efficiency grounds and for overallocating resources to health care, 10 0 but not
for reducing quality. The quality concern frequently voiced is precisely the
opposite-that departures from the traditional fee-for-service third party
payment system will impair quality. Efforts by insurers, alternative health
plans, and regulators to constrain, if not reduce, costs through use of the
existing payment system or the creation of competitive alternatives have been
and will continue to be resisted by providers and even some consumers on
quality-of-care grounds. I0' It is in this context that the issue is likely to be
raised in antitrust cases. If third party fee-for-service payments contribute to
failure of health care markets to perform in an economically efficient manner,
should this failure persist in order to assume quality?
98.

See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 3, at 854.

99.

See McClure, Implementing a Competitive Medical Care System through Public Policy, 7 J.

POL. POL'Y &

100.

HEALTH

L. 2, 8-9 (1982).

See, e.g., Bovbjerg, supra note 17, at 967-73; Feldman, The Impact of Third-Pary Payment on

ProfessionalPractice: Lessons from the Medical Profession, in

REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS

245 (R. Blair &

S. Rubin eds. 1980).
101. See, e.g., Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983) (Medicaid "boycott").
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As an example, consider physicians who boycott insurers because they
view the amounts they receive from insurers as inadequate for the provision of
quality care.' 0 2 This type of activity may become more common as insurers,
driven by increasing competition among themselves and with alternative care
systems such as HMO's, or by pressure from regulators or other sources, seek
more aggressively to contain costs by departing from traditional
reimbursement plans. In its simplest form, the quality-of-care justification in
this setting may be little more than an assertion that with more money better
care will be provided. To uphold a significant price restraint on these
grounds would be unacceptable under an antitrust analysis which
presupposes that quality/cost tradeoffs are optimized through the competitive
process. The conduct is designed to preserve the benefits of a structural
factor contributing to a degree of market failure, rather than to eliminate or
modify the effect of such failure. Market failures or imperfections may be
used in justifying otherwise unlawful restraints only with respect to conduct
that tends to perfect a market.
The market failure argument advanced to justify such a boycott might be
more complex than just suggested. Departures from traditional fee-forservice insurance plans which are driven by and premised on competitive
market forces cannot be expected to optimize cost/quality tradeoffs because
of a second imperfection in the market, the consumer's inability to make
informed choices. Cost constraints in such circumstances will lessen quality
because they constrain physicians in the services they can provide to all
consumers. Unless all market imperfections are ameliorated, there is no
reason to believe that the competitive process can assure quality of care.
Provider determinations about quality ought not be displaced by judgments
of insurers or the government, who are less qualified.
This argument assumes either that insurers do not share the consumer's
interest in quality of care, or that they too are unable to make informed
quality/cost tradeoffs. Neither proposition is self-evident. Insurers in
competitive markets cannot market insurance plans that fail to satisfy the
needs of the consumers within their plans. Most insurance plans are
marketed to employers, often acting in conjunction with labor unions. These
purchasers may be expected to demand quality and to look for plans that meet
those needs. This surrogate effect with respect to quality was recognized in
Indiana Federation of Dentists. 103 Political pressures are likely to drive the
government in the same way. Moreover, in the long run, insurers must have a
102. See, e.g., Ratino v. Medical Service of the District of Columbia, 718 F.2d 1260 (4th Cir. 1983)
(agreement on rates to be reimbursed by insurers); Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191
(1983). See generally Raup, supra note 10.
103. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) ("[Insurers] are themselves in
competition for the patronage of the patients-or, in most cases, the unions or businesses that
contract on their behalf for group insurance coverage-and must satisfy their potential customers
not only that they will provide coverage at reasonable cost, but also that that coverage will be
adequate to meet their customers' . . . needs.").
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strong interest in quality in order to reduce their own costs. 10 4 Inadequate
care is likely, in the long run, to increase those costs. The fact that consumers
may not be able to make informed judgments about quality of care is
therefore not critical if those upon whom they rely, providers and insurers,
have incentives to optimize quality/cost tradeoffs and have the information
upon which to make judgments. This is not of course a complete answer to
the argument just suggested. Insurers may also lack information, although to
a lesser degree, and, like consumers, are confronted with considerable
uncertainty. Again, however, this is fundamentally an argument that health
care markets are so characterized by failure that the antitrust laws should not
apply at all. While justifications of conduct that tends to perfect markets are
consistent with consumer welfare analysis, preservation of inefficiency caused
by a traditional fee-for-reimbursement system-because the market is
imperfect in another respect-is inconsistent with the basic premises of the
consumer welfare model.
There are, however, activities by provider groups and others with respect
to health care markets that improve the functioning of the market by
correction of market failures and imperfections. These activities are
procompetitive in the consumer welfare sense. Quality-of-care justifications
may in fact involve such corrections. If so, the justification is relevant. It
should be noted, however, that the focus is on market failure and not directly
on quality of care, which is but an incident to improvement in the competitive
process.
The most obvious examples relate to joint activities that assist informed
decisionmaking about quality/cost tradeoffs by providing information and
advice, eliminating deception, or increasing the comparability of providers
and services.' 0 5 Certification and accreditation programs are likely, for
example, to provide useful information about quality of services (or at least
more useful information than is otherwise available). 10 6 Professional selfregulation that reduces deception, may also be characterized as lessening
market imperfection, particularly where, as in health care markets, consumers
104. The provision of inadequate care to insureds will in many cases result in higher total
treatment costs for those individuals, costs which the insurer must reimburse. Assuming that the
insurer has incentives to reduce its own costs, it has an efficiency interest in the quality of care
provided its insureds. Where the insurer is in direct competition with other insurers, it will have
strong incentives to reduce its costs. If, however, the insurer is a monopolist, it may not be driven to
reduce its costs to the same degree. This is a point over which there is some disagreement. Compare
R. POSNER, supra note 80, at 15-16, with H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 2124 (1985). An insurer who is simply the alter ego of or controlled by providers may also lack
incentives to lower costs, to the extent that cost reduction would be contrary to the controlling
providers' interests. See, e.g., Havighurst & McDonough, The Lithotripsy Game in North Carolina: A New
Technology Under Regulation and Deregulation, 19 IND. L. REV. 989, 1016-20 (1986).
105. See generally Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health Professions: Developing a
Framework for Assessing Private Restraints, 34 VAND. L. REV. 927, 947-49 (1981). Some product
standardization agreements, for example, may enhance competition by increasing the comparability
of the products of a number of different producers. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 98, at 275-77
(1977).
106. See generally Havighurst & King, supra note 11; Kissam, supra note 47.
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lack adequate information and are therefore easily misled.' 0 7 Evaluation of
the informational effects of a broad range of professional activities must
recognize that judgments about quality/cost tradeoffs are made in large part
by actors in the market other than consumers. Because of the combination of
third party payment and uncertainty, consumers in effect delegate a
substantial number of these decisions to providers and insurers. 0 8
Information of little value to consumers may be useful to physicians. The
same may be true with respect to insurers. For example, accreditation of a
hospital may mean little to consumers, who have no understanding of the
standards applied by accrediting bodies. But the information and
professional judgment embodied in accreditation may be extremely useful to
physicians and insurers. The value of information must be measured with
reference to all who participate in the market.
Accreditation and certification programs may also have significant
anticompetitive effects. They may be used by a dominant professional group
to deny market access to competitors, and to facilitate cartels. 10 9 Where such
adverse effects predominate or result from conduct going beyond that
reasonably necessary to the provision of information valuable to consumers
and others who make market decisions, such programs violate current
antitrust standards. Where confined to activities that inform the process, and
to restraints reasonably ancillary to this end, they are both legitimate and
lawful.
c. Productive efficiency and quality of care. In some cases, arguments
couched in quality-of-care terms are really claims that by reason of integration
or otherwise the conduct in question increases productive efficiency and
reduces costs. This was true, for example, of the contention in Hyde that a
contract granting the exclusive right to provide anesthesiology services in the
107. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978); American Medical
Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1009 (1979), aff'd, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980). I do not suggest that
professional rules related to such matters as advertising and solicitation as an historical matter were
necessarily motivated by a desire to eliminate deception and thus enhance competition. The motives
for such rules are likely to have been mixed at best. Traditional rules on professional advertising and
solicitation directly restrain competition, and may have been intended to do so. But narrowly drawn
rules targeted directly at deception may have beneficial informational effects. It may also be that
courts and agencies dealing with the validity of such rules have been led to permit a continuation of
professional self-regulation dealing with deception, as was the case in the AMA litigation, more out
of a sense of good politics than a true concern with deception. But even if this were so, the effect of
eliminating deception is procompetitive.
108. The delegation from patient (agent) to physician (principal) on medical care matters is often
seen as a given. See, e.g., Beales, supra note 17, at 125-27; Bovbjerg, supra note 17, at 967-68;
Weingast, supra note 95, at 81. The delegation from insured to insurer is less clear. But decisions by
insurers about what care is appropriate, and therefore reimbursable, will in many cases displace the
insured's own judgment. Cf FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986).
109. Where sellers are few, the setting of uniform product standards may facilitate collusion by
making it easier for cartel members to detect cheating. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, at 101; L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 105, at 280. Accreditation and certification programs involving health care
markets will often involve too many providers for such an effect to be a plausible concern. The more
common adverse effect will be found in the use of such programs to exclude and thereby
competitively handicap providers or groups of providers who do not satisfy the standards adopted.
See, e.g., Havighurst & King, supra note 11, at 173.
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hospital's facilities permitted more effective monitoring of the quality of
service provided.11 There was no suggestion that such monitoring could not
occur without an exclusive contract. The claim was that an exclusive contract
provided a more efficient means of doing so. Similarly, denial of hospital staff
privileges to a physician or other provider who has a history of disrupting
hospital operations through bad personal relationships raises questions
relating to the efficiency of hospital operations.''' In these cases, quality is
not the real issue, and no measurement of quality is necessary. Increased
efficiency may improve quality as a by-product. Reduction in the cost of
providing service at a particular quality level may also result in a lowering of
price and greater availability of the service.
Efficiency claims are cognizable in an antitrust analysis predicated on price
and output effects in several different ways. Per se rules are not applied to
categories of conduct that may be efficiency-creating.'' 2 Where the conduct
under attack involves an integration of operations that may result in
significant efficiencies, the rule of reason is applied.' 13 Conduct which
"injures" competitors solely through efficiency is not anticompetitive., 1 4 It is

possible that conduct could simultaneously create market power and increase
efficiency. In such a case the determination of price and output effects
theoretically requires that efficiency gains be balanced against the effects of
increasing market power." 15 How and if such balancing can or should occur is
a fundamental issue in antitrust analysis which is generally beyond the scope
of this study.' 16 The point for present purposes is that antitrust analysis does
take efficiencies into account, and that quality-of-care claims which on closer
examination are assertions of efficiency creation are relevant and should be
treated like any other efficiency claims. ''

7

110. Jefferson Parish Hosp. District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 43 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
11l. The issue was squarely placed in efficiency terms in Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 820
n.60 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060 (1985). For other antitrust cases in which disruptive
behavior played a significant part in a hospital's decision to deny or terminate staff privileges, see, for
example, Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982); McElhinney v. Medical
Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ky. 1982). For a general discussion of the legal issues
involving such staff members, see Springer & Casale, Hospitals and the Disruptive Health Care
Practitioner-Isthe Inability to Work with Others Enough to Warrant Exclusion?, 24 DUQUESNE L. REv. 337
(1985).
112. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1979);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-55, 58 (1977).
113. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 105, § 77, at 206-10.
114. Although the Supreme Court appeared to suggest otherwise in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 334-46 (1962), the idea that competition can be harmed through increases in
productive efficiency has been "implicitly abandoned." H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, at 297.
Today, competitors "injured" solely by efficiency suffer no cognizable "antitrust injury." Id. at 37376.
115. R. BORK, supra note 14, at 123-29; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, at 299.
116. I have discussed this problem in more detail elsewhere. See Kauper, Comment: The Sullivan
Approach to Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 893, 913-15 (1987).
117. Evaluation of less restrictive alternatives, for example, should be required in health care
cases to the same extent that it is part of the analysis in antitrust cases generally. See supra text at
notes 169-70.
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In some health care cases, defendants have sought to justify restraints as a
means of avoiding legal liability for malpractice, or improper or inadequate
treatment.' I8 While not usually done, the argument can be put in efficiency
terms. Liability is a potential cost to providers. Premiums for insurance
against such liability are a cost with which providers must cope. Providers
able to reduce these costs may have a significant advantage over those who are
unable to do so. Provider conduct that lowers the risk of such liability, and
that may therefore reduce insurance costs, may be characterized as efficiencycreating.' 19 However, liability insurance premiums may not be sufficiently
sensitive to permit specific providers with good risk history to obtain lower
rates. The argument here presented assumes that they are. The benefits
consumers receive in the form of better health care are a result of actions
taken by providers for efficiency reasons, and not out of some sense of public
service. These efficiencies should be taken into account in antitrust analysis as
others are.
Consider once again the typical hospital staff privileges case. Dr. X applies
for staff privileges at Hospital Y. Upon recommendation of its medical staff,
some of whom practice the same specialty as Dr. X, Hospital Y denies the
application. The record in the ensuing antitrust litigation reveals that Dr. X
has had an extraordinarily large number of malpractice suits filed against him.
Large settlements have been paid. A hospital in a distant city has withdrawn
staff privileges on grounds of incompetence. Most cases of this type never
reach quality-of-care issues. They are dismissed for want of effect on
interstate comerce,120 or because the hospital's actions are within the state
action exemption, 12' or for a variety of other reasons. 12 2 However, additional
118. See, e.g., Friedman v. Delaware County Memorial Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171, 191-92 (E.D. Pa.
1987); Kaczanowski v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., 612 F. Supp. 688, 695-96 (D. Vt. 1985);
Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 572 F. Supp. 1424, 1428 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Williams v.
Kleaveland, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
65,486, at 68,358 (W.D. Mich. 1983). Cf Tripoli Co. v.
Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc) (upholding vertical customer restriction in part
because it protected seller from potential product liability). Commentators have suggested that
antitrust liability ought not be imposed where the acts in question reduce potential tort liability, but
have not generally put the argument in efficiency terms. See, e.g., Note, Health Professionals' Access to
Hospitals, supra note 7, at 1194. See also Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 6, at 602
(describing the "need to reach an accommodation between the goals of antitrust law and the
practical and legal effects of medical malpractice law" and hospital liability for inadequate staff
supervision as a "central problem" which "appears within virtually all substantive antitrust issues
dealing with privileges.")
119. See Denying Hospital Privileges, supra note 6, at 1219, 1242 (correctly noting that conduct that
decreases potential liability is procompetitive because it reduces costs).
120. For recent examples, see Pariser v. Christian Health Care Sys., Inc., 816 F.2d 1248, 1252-53
(8th Cir. 1987); Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp., 782 F.2d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 1986); Shehawy v.
Harrison, 755 F.2d 1432 (11 th Cir. 1985). For a full discussion and collection of cases see Marrese v.
Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 379-82 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
121. In Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 395 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027
(1985), the court held that termination of a surgeon's staff privileges pursuant to Indiana's statutory
peer-review process was exempt from federal antitrust laws under the "state action" exemption.
Marrese was followed by the Ninth Circuit, in Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498, 1506-07 (9th Cir.
1986), with respect to Oregon legislation, a decision subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court.
108 S. Ct. 1658 (1988). For other cases, see Posner v. Lankenau Hosp., 645 F. Supp. 1102, 1118
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (rejecting the reasoning of Marrese); Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp.
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facts could make the case more compelling. Dr. X is in a specialty that is
practiced by only two other physicians, both of whom are on the staff of
Hospital Y, the only hospital in the area. It is not possible to practice the
specialty without access to hospital facilities. Dr. X denies his incompetence.
This now looks more like a real antitrust case. The hospital now asserts that if
it grants Dr. X privileges, then its own risk of legal liability will be substantially
increased. Assuming that the factfinder concludes that Dr. X is incompetent,
and that granting staff privileges to a physician the hospital knows or should
know is incompetent will increase the hospital's risk of liability, its action
reduces its costs.
Does recognition that lowering the liability risk and the cost of liability
insurance is an efficiency create a virtually unlimited quality-of-care defense?
In other words, can any restraint which improves quality be said to be
efficiency-creating because it reduces insurance costs generally? The answer
is no, for several reasons. In the case posited, the hospital has arguably
reduced its own costs, where the very act of admitting Dr. X to staff privileges
in itself could create liability. 12 3 Moreover, in making judgments about legal
liability a court is applying legal standards familiar to it. The standard
applied-whether the hospital's granting of staff privileges is an exercise of
reasonable care-does not require the identification and measurement of
quality in any absolute sense. Finally, even in the staff privileges case, the
reduction in costs that might result is simply a factor in the analysis, to be
treated no differently than other reductions in costs, and is not an absolute
defense. Thus, for example, efficiencies may not be used to justify conduct
that enhances market power if they may be obtained in a less restrictive
manner.

24

1

d. Quality of care as an element of rivalry. Firms compete not only on price,
but also on quality of product or service. Both are integral factors in the
consumer's decision to buy. The premise that quality/cost tradeoffs are
maximized through rivalry among competitors rests on this proposition.
Agreements among firms to eliminate quality rivalry through product
standardization or in some other fashion may have adverse consumer welfare
1226, 1238-39 (D. Del. 1985) (rejecting the reasoning of Marrese). This result will vary from state to
state. See Tambone v. Memorial Hosp. for McHenry County, 635 F. Supp. 508, 514-16 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (Illinois peer-review legislation differs sufficiently from Indiana's that Marrese does not apply).
The "state action" issue as it relates to hospital peer review is discussed in detail in Blumstein &
Sloan, supra note 6, at 34.
122. The issue of conspiracy for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act has been particularly
troublesome in staff privileges cases. Whether physicians on the staff may conspire with each other,
or with the hospital itself, is an issue over which there is some disagreement. The answer may turn
on the relationship of a particular hospital and the physicians involved. The "conspiracy" issue is
fully discussed in Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 6, at 39-53.
123. Negligent supervision or screening of its staff by a hospital may itself create a tort liability in
the hospital. The leading case is Darling v. Charlestown Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326,
211 N.E. 2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). The very act that allegedly constitutes the
antitrust violation is the same act that lessens the risk of tort liability.
124. See infra text at notes 171-72.
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effects; they may represent a restriction of output. 1 25 Such agreements may

also facilitate price collusion.' 26 Conversely, conduct by single firms to
enhance quality, or perhaps more accurately their reputation for quality,
contributes to their ability to compete and thus to the competitiveness of the
marketplace. The so-called goodwill defense in tying cases, 12 7 for example,
rests on the procompetitive effect of protection of reputation.
The quality-of-care defense offered in some health care cases is an
assertion that the challenged provider conduct promotes rivalry through
protection of reputation. The most obvious example is a hospital's denial of
staff privileges to a physician who is simply incompetent, or has a public
reputation of incompetence. The hospital will contend that the effect of its
action is to prevent debasement of the quality of care its patients receive. It is
not, however, acting out of some purely altruistic, public service concern.
The presence of such a physician on the staff will damage the hospital's
reputation, and thus its ability to compete.' 2 8 It may also injure the
reputation of other members of the staff through association, although this
effect is less obvious. If these effects are strong enough, the hospital may lose
125. See supra text at note 88.
126. Agreements with respect to quality may eliminate differences among products and thus
make it easier to detect cheating on the cartel price. Such agreements may also be used to eliminate
lower-priced products which put price pressure on the market. See supra notes 89, 109.
127. The goodwill defense rests on a showing that a tying arrangement is necessary in order to
assure that the reputation of the tying product is not injured when the buyer uses with it an inferior
product, or a product that otherwise damages or causes the tying product to malfunction. The
Supreme Court has rejected the defense each time it has been presented, on the ground that in each
case contractual specifications would afford adequate protection without a tying arrangement. See
Jefferson Parish Hosp. District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26 n.42 (1984). The defense has been
accepted in lower court cases where less restrictive alternatives have been found inadequate. See
Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987);
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 556-57 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
931 (1961); Telaflex Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 293 F. Supp. 106, 109 (E.D. Pa. 1968);
United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556-58 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365
U.S. 567 (1961). The Supreme Court's treatment of the defense has rested on the availability of less
restrictive alternatives and is not a rejection of the competitive desirability of protecting reputation
for quality.
128. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 820 n.60 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1060 (1985), where the court correctly observed that:
[B]y restricting staff privileges to doctors who have achieved a predetermined level of
medical competence, a hospital will enhance its reputation and the quality of the medical
care it delivers. Thus such action is pro-competitive ....
Accord Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 919 (W.D. Pa. 1981), afftd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 521 F. Supp. 1352, 1365 (W.D. Pa.
1982). See also Potters Medical Center v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 1986), where
the court observed that while the enhancement of reputation for quality is normally procompetitive,
this may not be the case when the hospital is a monopolist (presumably because the hospital does not
have anyone to compete with in quality terms). Not all staff privileges cases have perceived that there
is a correlation between reputation for quality and competitive rivalry. See Quinn v. Kent Gen.
Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1226, 1224 (D. Del. 1985), where the court apparently saw quality as a noncompetitive benefit to patients which must somehow be balanced against adverse effects "in the
market for hospital facilities."
Given the prevalence of third party payment, reputation for quality is a critically important factor
in the competitive rivalry among hospitals. Price adjustments are likely to have little competitive

impact. See Salkever, Competition Among Hospitals, in
155, 157 (W. Greenberg ed. 1978).

COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR

149,
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* patients not only through consumer choice but because other physicians,
fearful for their own reputations, leave the staff, taking their patients with
them. 129
A court called upon to decide such a case need not consider these effects
unless the denial of staff privileges is likely to have adverse price and output
effects in the market served by the denied physician. In most cases, such
effects are likely only when staff privileges are competitively significant, where
these competitively significant benefits are not reasonably obtainable
elsewhere, and where the number of competing physicians with such
privileges is small. Under these circumstances, the denial of entry may
protect a cartel among those already established.' 3 0 Few denials of staff
privileges to individual physicians (or other providers) are likely to have such
adverse price and output effects. 1 But where they do, the reputational
effects of granting privileges become relevant and should be treated in the
same manner as efficiencies. The likelihood of these effects must be evaluated
on the record. The problems of defining quality should not be an obstacle
here. The focus is more on reputation than quality as such. It is- not
necessary to define quality in some absolute sense. The standard will
generally be akin to that applied in malpractice and similar tort cases. In
addition, the restraint imposed should not be broader than necessary to
protect reputation. As with efficiencies, the injury to reputation will not be
considered if reputation can be equally safeguarded in a less restrictive
32

manner. 1

In the staff privileges case just discussed, the adverse reputational impact,
if any, occurs because if staff privileges are granted, the incompetent physician
is identified in the minds of consumers with the hospital. In a number of cases
in which broad quality-of-care claims have been advanced, this will not be the
case. Suppose, for example, that a professional association of physicians
boycotts an insurance company because it reimburses consumers who use the
services of chiropractors. The doctors assert that the elimination of
chiropractors will improve the quality of care because chiropractic care is both
inferior and dangerous. Even assuming that this assertion could somehow be
established, the boycott will not improve the quality of care, nor the
reputation for quality of care, provided by the boycotting physicians. There is
no reason to believe that consumers associate chiropractors with physicians.
129. Physicians with staff privileges are the medium through which the hospital obtains patients.
If a hospital loses physicians from its staff, it loses hospital patients as well.
130. The exclusion of a single competitor from a hospital staff will likely work little hardship even
on the individual's ability to compete if he or she has comparable hospital access elsewhere in the
community. Moreover, even if the excluded provider is competitively handicapped, there will be no
adverse price and output effects unless the group from which he or she has been excluded has both
the ability to collude and the power to raise price if they do. In normal circumstances, denial of staff
benefits to individuals is of little consequence unless the hospital has substantial market power, or
there is other evidence of collusion in the market.
131. Adverse effects are more likely where an entire class of competitors or potential competitors
(e.g., podiatrists, nurse-midwives) are denied hospital access. See text at notes 7, 251; Denying Hospital
Privileges, supra note 6, at 1240-47.
132. See infra text at notes 169-70.
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The relevance of quality (and reputation for quality) as an element of the
competitive rivalry princi~ple here discussed is subject to still other limitations.
Unless there is no correlation between quality and consumers' perceptions
about it, quality must be directly evaluated.13 3 Antitrust analysis rests on the
proposition that the market decides the appropriate quality/cost tradeoffs.
Judges cannot, consistent with such analysis, define and decide what
constitutes quality improvement. At the most, judges can make
determinations that a given procedure or actor is one that no significant
number of consumers with full knowledge would choose.' 3 4 Finally, in many
cases the clear availability of less restrictive means to the same end will defeat
reliance on such justification.
To illustrate, assume an agreement among hospitals not to employ a
particular procedure (or piece of equipment) because, in their collective
judgment, the procedure is worthless in all cases and dangerous in most. The
non-use of such a procedure might improve quality, and therefore each
hospital's ability to compete. If the procedure is truly dangerous, the decision
not to use it might enhance each hospital's reputation for quality.
Conceivably, a court could determine that a specific procedure has no worth
to anyone. But this is not likely to be the case. Some may disagree over its
efficiency or dangerousness. It may be that it is of value to a small number of
terminally ill patients with full knowledge of the risks, which in their case are
worth taking. The very fact that the hospitals feel compelled to agree not to
use the procedure suggests that it would be elected by some (although it
might be chosen only by persons with inadequate information). 3 5 The
market then should make the determination. 3 6 In addition, the argument
that rivalry will be enhanced is weakened by the uniformity of the agreement.
Where all rivals agree, there is no effect on rivalry at all.' 37 Finally, this is a
circumstance where, if the case is as the hospitals say it is, there is no need for
agreement. Every hospital with full knowledge about the procedure would
elect not to use it on its own.

133. In some cases, consumers' perceptions might be evaluated directly. But normally those
perceptions must be presumed to be in accord with the quality-of-care level itself. Thus the quality
must somehow be evaluated. As an alternative, some might suggest that the critical issue is whether
the parties' purpose was to enhance quality of care. A purpose to improve quality is some evidence
that such improvement will occur, but even if such a purpose is clear, the standard cannot rest on
purpose alone. See infra text at notes 129-49.
134. This will likely be the case where the issue is an incompetent provider, or a procedure that is
medically useless. There may also be instances in which consumers who lack full information
perceive quality to be different than it really is. For example, consumers might perceive that a given
procedure is dangerous when it is not. Since quality rivalry is a matter of perception, provider
responses based upon this perception may be viewed as procompetitive. But in many such cases the
provision of full information is an adequate less restrictive alternative.
135. Provision of adequate information without further agreement about the procedure would
itself be procompetitive.
136. Alternatively, the state could make the political judgment to eliminate the procedure.
137. Cf Potters Medical Center v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 577 (6th Cir. 1986)
(enhancement of quality not necessarily procompetitive where hospital lacks rivals).
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e. Purpose as an element in health care cases. Courts and commentators on
occasion have suggested that with some types of conduct, a predicate to
antitrust liability is a determination that the conduct was accompanied by a
purpose to injure competition. 3 8 If a bad purpose is necessary to establish a
violation in a given case, proof of a good purpose is relevant to negate proof
of a purpose which is bad. 139 In a variation of the theme, it has been argued
that while violation does not depend upon a bad purpose, conduct which does
not have a commercial purpose is outside the scope of antitrust." 40 If the
138. The insistence on a purpose (or intent) to injure competition appears most commonly in
commentaries and cases involving monopolization, attempts to monopolize, and boycotts. A number
of early monopolization cases spoke primarily in terms of a purpose or intent to monopolize or
restrain trade. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 75 (1911). Later cases have
rejected a purpose-based standard and have made liability turn on an objective judgment about the
nature of the acts in question. See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 797
F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW

626 (1978). The broad general standard for attempts to monopolize, however, continues to speak of
the need to establish a specific intent to obtain a monopoly or exclude competitors. See Cooper,
Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly ExpansionaryAnswer to the ProphylacticRiddle of Section 2, 72 MIcH.
L. REV. 373, 392-400 (1974). Again, specific intent has come to mean little more than that the
defendant is presumed to intend the consequences of its acts. See P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra, at
822. Reliance on anticompetitive purpose as a predicate of liability, or on good purpose to
exonerate from liability (or at least from application of a per se rule), is more common in cases in
which boycotts are alleged. See infra note 148.
Intent is an element of proof in criminal cases brought under the Sherman Act, although even in
such cases the government need only establish that acts with anticompetitive effects were undertaken
with knowledge of their consequences. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
444 (1978).
139. Throughout this discussion "purpose" and "intent" are used interchangeably. Some
commentators have distinguished among these terms, characterizing "intent" as the desire of
individuals or groups to effect means that could accomplish particular goals, while stating that
"purpose" refers to the goals or objectives themselves. See Kissam, Antitrust Boycott Doctrine, 69 IOWA
L. REV. 1165, 1180-81 (1984); Coons, Von-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U. L.
REV. 705, 709-2 (1962). The distinction is not critical for consideration of the particular issue at
hand, namely, whether a good purpose (or intent) provides a defense for conduct otherwise shown to
have adverse price and output effects. When purpose is said to be of relevance in determining
effects, the reference is to goals or objectives.
140. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 (1970); Selman v. Harvard
Medical School, 494 F. Supp. 603, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1204 (2d Cir. 1980)
(academic admissions criteria legitimate because non-commercial); Nara v. American Dental Ass'n,
526 F. Supp. 452, 457-458 (W.D. Mich. 1981). The cases are discussed in Havighurst & King, supra
note 11, at 170 n. 125; Kissam, supra note 41, at 47-48 n.258. The presence of a non-commercial
purpose may also be used to avoid the application of per se rules, rather than to take the case out of
the antitrust laws altogether. See, e.g., Kreuzer v. American Academy of Periodontology, 558 F. Supp.
683, 684-685 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1984); McElhinney v. Medical Protective
Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 133 (E.D. Ky. 1982), rev'don other grounds, 1984-1 Trade Cas. CCH
66,054
(6th Cir.); Note, The Professionsand Noncommercial Purposes. Applicability of Per Se Rules Under the Sherman
Act, 11 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 387 (1978). This more limited use of non-commercial purpose may be
seen as little more than recognition that in such cases effects may be sufficiently uncertain that a full
rule of reason inquiry is needed.
The concept of non-commercial purpose in antitrust analysis goes beyond the activities of
professionals. See Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 705
(1962); Note, Now or Never; Is There Antitrust Liability for Noncommercial Boycotts?, 80 COL. L. REV. 1317
(1980) (focus on non-commercial boycotts as those involving an element of political action, where
first amendment values are involved). But recent cases and commentary relying on the
commercial/non-commercial distinction have all involved professional activity, and have rested in
part on the admonition in Goldfarb that professions might be treated differently (see Nara, 526 F.
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motive of the actors is not related to their economic interests, their conduct is
secure from antitrust attack. These two concepts of purpose are not coterminus. Not every commercial purpose is one to injure competition. If
either of these positions is correct, a purpose to improve quality of care or to
protect patients from improper or unsafe treatment is relevant in
conventional antitrust analysis, without regard to whether the professions or
health care providers are treated differently for antitrust purposes than
anybody else. If the sole purpose is to safeguard patients, the purpose is not
to injure competition. If all that motivates the conduct is a sense of
14 1
professional responsibility, the purpose can be said to be non-commercial.
A detailed examination of the relevance of purpose in antitrust analysis
generally is beyond the scope of this paper. It is sufficient for present
purposes to note that antitrust focuses on effects, or, in some cases, likely
effects. 14 2 A worthy purpose will not save conduct with adverse price and
output effects. 14 3 If such effects are present, the violation is no worse if
accompanied by a purpose to achieve them. Conversely, if the conduct
promotes efficiency or otherwise promotes competition, it will not be
condemned. Much the same may be said about the distinction between
commercial and non-commercial purpose. That the parties acted for
commercial reasons does not inform a judgment with respect to adverse
competitive effects; the enhancement of efficiency, for example, is a
commercial purpose. And even a non-commercial purpose will not justify
conduct where the effects are in fact anticompetitive.
Purpose is relevant only as a guide to a judgment about effects, both
adverse and beneficial. 144 Where those who know a market act for the avowed
purpose of restraining it, their intention is some evidence that adverse effects
will occur. 14 5 Similarly, an unambiguous intention to promote efficiency is
probative in determining whether conduct does so. Such proof of course may
also negate the attempt by plaintiff to establish the opposite, that the purpose
was to restrain competition. The role of purpose is evidentiary. Standing
alone, it can neither justify nor condemn. Only when direct evidence of
adverse effects is lacking or ambiguous, and the inferences drawn from
conduct alone are not compelling, is there reason to examine motive. A good
Supp. at 457-58); they do not stand for the proposition that the distinction is part of a broader
antitrust analysis.
Finally, it should be noted that whatever the relevance of purpose in a consumer welfare-based
antitrust analysis, there is no logical reason to distinguish between a non-commercial purpose and a
commercial purpose to increase efficiency or gain a competitive advantage, which are at least equally
legitimate.
141. See Note, supra note 140, at 398-407.
1506.
142. See the excellent discussion in 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 48, at
143. Id.
144. The classic statement is found in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238 (1918), where the Court stated that intention is relevant "not because a good intention will save
an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and predict consequences."
1506.
145. See P. AREEDA, supra note 48, at
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purpose is not relevant in a horizontal price/fixing case, for example, because
the inference of adverse effects is compulsory.
Purpose is often relied upon in evaluating agreements among competitors
to which rules involving boycotts might be applied. 14 6 The reason apparently
lies in those rules themselves. Traditionally, boycotts have been described as
per se violations, illegal without consideration of effects.' 4 7 Until very
recently the definition of boycott, for the purpose of this rule, has been far too
broad. 14 8 Virtually any horizontal agreement can be characterized as a
boycott. For example, a simple price-fixing agreement is a concerted refusal
by the conspirators to deal with anyone who will not pay the fixed price. 14 9
The characterization is immaterial, because such conduct is per se illegal
anyway. But in cases involving joint ventures and trade and professional
associations, application of a per se rule, focused more on means than effects,
has jeopardized

legitimate

activities

that

have

no

adverse

impact. 1 50

Confronted with conduct that appears legitimate, and a rule that seemed to
146. See Kissam, supra note 139, at 1165, 1191-92; Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to
Deal. A Rule Ripefor Reexamination, 79 COL. L. REV. 685, 693-94 (1979). Statements that a boycott is
per se illegal only when there is a purpose to exclude competitors or to carry out some other anticompetitive objective abound in decided cases. See, e.g., De Fillippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d
1313, 1318 (3d Cir. 1975); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71, 76 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
147. The most extreme statements of the rule are found in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
373 U.S. 341, 347 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). In
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 290 (1985),
the Court recognized that it "has long held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts
are so likely to restrict competition without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be
condemned as per se violations of § I of the Sherman Act."
148. The formulation of the per se rule in KIors, 359 U.S. at 212, literally encompasses any
concerted refusal to deal. This would include a variety of activities of trade associations and joint
ventures which are not anticompetitive. Virtually any agreement among firms concerning terms of
sale or product can also be characterized as a concerted refusal to deal. For the variety of
agreements to which the per se rule could be applied see P. AREEDA, supra note 48, at
385, 390.
Much of the criticism of the rule has been directed to its breadth, and has been accompanied by
proposals to narrow the rule in one fashion or another. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 105, at
229-32; Heidt, Industry Self-Regulation and the Useless Concept "Group Boycott", 39 VAND. L. REV. 1507
(1986); Kissam, supra note 139; Bauer, supra note 146; Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman
Act: Some Reflections on the Klors Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1172 (1959). As put by Judge Robert Bork
in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1033 (1987):
Despite the seeming inflexibility of the rule as enunciated by the Court, it has always been
clear that boycotts are not, and cannot ever be, per se illegal. To apply so rigid and
simplistic an approach would be to destroy many common and entirely beneficial business
arrangements.
These criticisms of the breadth and uncertainty of the formulation of the per se rule were
acknowledged by the Court in both Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985), and FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
(1986).
149. See Rahl, supra note 148, at 1172.
150. For example, application of a per se boycott rule whenever a trade association or joint
venture enforces its standards through a denial of membership to competitors who fail to meet those
standards threatens the legitimate and often procompetitive activities of such organizations. The
Court's reformulation of the per se rule in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery
& Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 296 (1985), was in response to just such a concern.
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preclude consideration of effects, lower courts have avoided its application in
52
a variety of ways.' 5 1 Some have done so by emphasizing purpose.
The per se rule with respect to boycotts has been particularly troublesome
in health care cases. Virtually any professional association rule which is
enforced through a denial of benefits, such as staff privileges or accreditation,
can be described as a boycott. 153 Emphasis on purpose in health care cases of
this type has added flexibility and mitigated the harshness of the per se rule.
With the Supreme Court's reformulations of boycott doctrine in Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. 154 and FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists, 155 there is less need for such reliance on the parties'
purposes. These decisions move in the direction of effects analysis. 1 56 And in
an antitrust policy whose sole concern is price and output effects, purpose
serves only as evidence of effect.
A purpose to enhance or protect quality of care is thus relevant in only one
of two ways. Evidence of such purpose may negate evidence of a purpose to
injure competition, unless the demonstrated purpose is to improve quality by
eliminating competitors. Furthermore, it is some evidence that the effect is
151. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, for example, has confined the per se rule to
cases in which a boycott is used "to enforce a rule or policy or practice that is itself illegal per se."
Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984). See also discussion in
Heidt, supra note 148, at 1525-36. The rule has also been confined to cases involving agreements
among competitors where the direct effect is upon firms competing at the same level. See, e.g., Lomar
Wholesale Grocery v. Dieter's Foods, 824 F.2d 582, 590-591 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
707 (1988); M & H Tire Co., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 978 (1st Cir. 1984). In
Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 215-216 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1033 (1986), the court seems to have limited the per se rule to boycotts that are "naked,"
i.e., not ancillary to a legitimate joint venture or other integration. Still other reformulations have
been offered by commentators. See L. SULLIVAN, supra 105, at 241 (per se rule should be confined to
"explicit" boycotts); Bauer, supra note 146, at 717 (per se rule should be limited to those boycotts
"where the parties intended to coerce or exclude another in order to lessen or eliminate some form
of competition"); Heidt, supra note 148, at 1540-51 (urging tort law approach); Kissam, supra note
146, at 1194 (primary per se rule where boycott has a "dominant anticompetitive purpose").
152. See supra note 146. These cases use purpose to avoid application of a per se rule, and do not
stand for the proposition that boycotts with demonstrable anticompetitive effects are lawful if done
for a good purpose.
Purpose has also been relied on to avoid the application of the per se rule in other boycott cases
involving professionals. See supra note 140. But these cases rest on the view that professional activity
warrants special treatment and do not necessarily represent standards applicable to boycotts
generally.
153. See Havighurst & King, supra note 11, at 174.
154. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
155. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
156. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the Court held that the per se rule did not apply to expulsion
from a purchasing cooperative made up of plaintiff's competitors absent a showing that the
cooperative "possesses market power or unique access to a business element necessary for effective
competition." 472 U.S. at 298. Without such a showing, a court could not find that the expulsion
was per se illegal. Id. The Court also noted that in prior cases in which it had applied a per se rule,
the practices were not justified "by plausible arguments that were intended to enhance overall
efficiency." Id. at 294. The meaning of Northwest Wholesale Stationers is unclear. Would a per se rule
apply to an expulsion if the venture possessed market power even if efficiency justifications are clear?
One would think not. This is not a naked restraint. But whatever the answer, the Court's emphasis
on market power is consistent with an effects analysis. The boycott analysis in Indiana Federationof
Dentists is similar, although qualified by the observation that "we have been slow to condemn rules of
professional associations as unreasonable per se." 476 U.S. at 458.
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likely to be as the parties intend. Even in this limited role, evidence of
purpose is not likely to be particularly helpful. Purpose is notoriously difficult
to ascertain.' 5 7 The same person or organization may have mixed motives.
One might act to increase both efficiency and price, or to injure competitors
and provide better care to the public. When multiple actors are involved in
the alleged violation, each may act with a single purpose, but their purposes
may differ. The identification of a single or dominant purpose may itself be
sufficiently complex that such a judicially found purpose is totally unreliable
as any indicator of likely effect.
Purpose is of limited relevance in an evaluation of price and output effects,
even where its proof is clear. The intention to protect the public health, or
the quality of care provided to particular patients, cannot justify conduct
whose adverse impact is demonstrated or inferable from the conduct itself.
Such a worthy purpose, even if proven, is in no sense a defense. And it is
unlikely in most cases that conduct inviting antitrust attack is motivated solely
by such purpose in any event.' 58
f
The structure of analysis-balancing and less restrictive alternatives. While
there is no single quality-of-care defense in consumer welfare analysis,
contentions about quality that are predicated on corrections of market
failures, more efficient use of resources, protection of reputation for quality,
and, to a limited extent, intention may in appropriate cases be relevant in
determining competitive effect. But what weight are such factors to be given?
How are they to be taken into account? Can and should an analysis be
structured in some fashion, or should judges (and juries) simply be instructed
to take all facts into account?
These are not new questions. Courts and commentators have struggled
for decades to devise an analytic structure that would consider such factors in
an ordered and logical fashion. ' 59 The ancillarity test adopted in United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 160 for example, is designed to work an
accommodation between adverse competitive effects and efficiencies achieved
through integrations (or partial integrations) of competing firms. 16 1 Where
the restraint is naked, that is, related to no efficiency gain other than that
which may be accomplished by reducing competition, it is condemned.
Conversely, where the restraint accompanies an integration that is not itself
objectionable and is likely to enhance competition, it is tolerated if it is
157. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 48, at 1506. Professor Kissam, in proposing a "purpose-based"
standard for boycott cases, defines purpose as a "construct about the plausible goals of rational
actors," an objective conclusion drawn in part from an examination of power and effect. Kissam,
supra note 139, at 1182. While such a standard does not encounter all of the proof difficulties
inherent in proving actual purpose, it is in essence a power and effect test, a kind of structured rule of
reason in which anticompetitive effects and efficiency gains need not be balanced against each other
once the predominating "purpose" is determined.
158. See, e.g., Leibenluft & Pollard, supra note 38, at 953, 960.
159. For more detailed discussions, see Sullivan, supra note 82; Kauper, Comment: The Sullivan
Approach to Horizontal Restraints, supra note 82.
160. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.), modified and aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
161. See R. BORK, supra note 14, at 26-30.
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reasonably necessary to the integration. Per se rules likewise rest on such an
accommodation. They are appropriate only for conduct that in virtually all
cases has significant adverse price and output effect and little likelihood of
promoting efficiencies.' 6 2 More recently, such accommodation has been
sought through the development of a structured rule of reason.

63

Analysis must begin by asking whether the conduct at issue has had, or is
likely to have, adverse price and output effects. If such effects could be
directly measured, the inquiry would end. But in few cases can this be done,
and in even fewer can it be done efficiently within the judicial process. As a
result, inferences must be drawn from conduct and the market power of the
firms involved.
Per se treatment without examination of power is appropriate in those
cases where the conduct is almost invariably output-restricting, seldom
efficiency-creating, and where a bright line rule is necessary for deterrence
purposes. In recent years, the use and scope of per se rules has been sharply
restricted. Horizontal price-fixing and market division remain per se
illegal, 1 64 and should remain so as long as confined to cartel behavior. These
rules are as applicable to health care markets as others. Tying arrangements
are subject to what is still described as a per se rule, which in reality is not. 16 5
There is every indication that tying arrangements may be justified in
reputational terms, 1 66 a justification not peculiar to health care markets. The
per se rule against boycotts is being contracted and modified to focus on the
legitimacy of the underlying agreement which is carried out through the
refusal to deal. 16 7 While the boycott rule has been particularly troublesome in
health care cases, it is troublesome for reasons applicable to other markets as
162. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (per se rule
appropriate if practice is "plainly anticompetitive" and without "redeeming virtue"); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977) (similar).
163. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 48, at
1511; Kauper, supra note 82, at 901, 905-15; Sullivan,
supra note 82, at 838-55. Compare Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 14-39 (1984)
(suggesting a set of "filters" to be used in antitrust analysis), with Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics
in Judicial Making: Antitrust As a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 567-76 (1986), and Markovits, The
Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41, 76-86 (1984) (both
criticizing Easterbrook's approach, albeit on quite different grounds).
164. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (horizontal price-fixing
illegal per se); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (same for horizontal
market division).
165. In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the majority and
concurring Justices disagreed over whether the per se categorization should apply to tying
arrangements, which have long been so characterized. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Whatever one's views on this verbal disagreement, the important point
is that such arrangements are illegal per se only if the seller has market power (presumably more
than 30% of the market in the tying product) or that product is otherwise unique. See Hyde, 466 U.S.
at 13. This version of the per se rule is a far cry from the per se rule applied in horizontal price-fixing
cases, where market power is irrelevant. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
224-26 n.59 (1940). Recognition of a "goodwill" defense (see supra note 127) and the possible
willingness to permit tying arrangements as market entry devices, Hyde, 466 U.S. at 23-24 n.39, are
also inconsistent with the per se analysis of Socony-Vacuum. The analysis applied in tying cases is best
described as a structural rule of reason.
166. The goodwill defense protects reputation.
167. See supra notes 149, 150, 156.
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well. To the extent the rule is not based on effects, it is inconsistent with
consumer welfare analysis as applied in any market. The determination that a
per se boycott rule is appropriate in a health care case is no different than in
any other.
In cases not subject to a per se rule, analysis must begin with whether the
conduct could have adverse price and output effects. If the parties lack market
power, such effects cannot be likely, and the case should be dismissed. The
68
examination of market power is therefore the next step.'
Where these two preliminary criteria are satisfied, more detailed
examination of effects and justifications will be necessary. Market failure
considerations now become relevant in the effects analysis, to determine
whether inferences drawn from such conduct in markets not characterized by
such failure are appropriate in this instance. Allegations of failure may not be
established. The conduct in question may have little to do with correcting the
failure. Efficiencies claimed may be nonexistent or trivial. Reputational
effects may be slight, or the actions taken not reasonably related to the
reputational harm asserted. In such cases, these alleged justifications can be
ignored.
Where on its face the parties' conduct is likely to have adverse price and
output effects, and efficiencies or the need to guard against reputational harm
are established, these procompetitive effects need not be considered in the
analysis if they can be achieved in a reasonable, less restrictive way. The
availability of less restrictive alternatives suggests that the parties' purpose is
broader than achieving that which they could do equally well without the
restraint. And society ought not bear the burdens of output-restricting
conduct when such conduct is not necessary to achieve the benefit alleged.
The rejection of justifications because less restrictive means to the same
end are available is well-established in antitrust doctrine. 169 But care must be
taken in applying such a reasonable alternatives test. It can too easily become
a way of second-guessing legitimate business judgments with the benefit of
hindsight. Justifications should not be rejected because bright lawyers at trial
suggest an alternative which might have been available. Alternatives, for this
0
purpose, must be reasonable and relatively obvious.17

Only the hard cases will survive the analysis to this point. These are cases
where the conduct may create or use market power to restrict output, and
simultaneously promote productive efficiencies or enhance reputation. In
such cases, courts and commentators often speak of balancing pro- and
168. See Kauper, supra note 82, at 905-08. Market power is not a necessary step if antitrust must
account for values other than economic efficiency.
169. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 114-15, 119 (1984). The Court's rejection of
the goodwill defense in a number of tying cases has rested squarely on an evaluation of less
restrictive alternatives. See supra note 118. For health care cases resting, in whole or in part, on
consideration of less restrictive alternatives see, e.g., Kreuzer v. American Academy of
Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1495 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp.
1465, 1483 (N.D. II1. 1987). Fuller discussions may be found in 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 48, at
1505a; Kauper, supra note 82, at 908-09.
170. See Kauper, supra note 82, at 909.
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anticompetitive effects. 17 1 Balancing assumes that such effects are not only
identified but quantified, a relatively hopeless task. 1 72 Purpose, if
demonstrable, may be useful as a guide at this point. Because of the difficulty
in identifying efficiencies and quantifying not only efficiencies but price and
output effects as well, some have suggested that there be no consideration of
fact-specific efficiencies at all. 173 Outcomes would depend solely on the
output-restricting consequences of conduct, measured through use of
economic theory. While others have suggested that such a balance may be
drawn in some cases,' 7 4 it may well be that the best that can be expected is
judgment about predominant effects based on informed intuition.
2. Beyond Consumer Welfare: Quality of Care in a Multi-Valued Antitrust Policy.
The discussion to this point has assumed that antitrust policy is concerned
solely with economic efficiency. But whether this is so is the subject of
ongoing debate.' 7 5 Moreover, the reservations about professional activity
expressed in Goldfarb and repeated in various reformulations subsequently
may suggest that even if antitrust policy generally is confined to an analysis of
price and output effects, professions are to be treated differently. If so, the
Court must mean that goals other than economic efficiency must somehow be
accommodated, and quality-of-care concerns might be treated differently than
under the consumer welfare model.
Some contend that while antitrust policy incorporates the goal of
efficiency, it also encompasses a variety of other values from the political and
social effects of corporate size to "fairness" in the marketplace. 176 The issue
will not be resolved here. However, would incorporation of this broader set
of values result in greater, or lesser, recognition of quality-of-care claims?
The answer turns on the values incorporated and their place in the
appropriate analysis.
Generally, the inclusion of values such as redistribution of income,
freedom from coercion, the preservation of small business, and so on results
in an expansion of the definition of "anticompetitive." For example, conduct
which "coerces" others would be condemned even if not likely to have
171. See, e.g., 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 48, at 1507; Graphic Prod. Distrib., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717
F.2d 1560, 1571 (11 th Cir. 1983); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 572 F. Supp. 1424, 1429 (1983).
172. See Kauper, supra note 82, at 899, 900, 911-13.
173. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 14, at 123-29.
174.

3 P. AREEDA

& D. TURNER,

ANTITRUST LAW, supra note

138, at

948-60

(possible

efficiencies defense in merger cases); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (discussing viability of economics defense).
175. See supra note 82.
176. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 163, at 562-67 (antitrust encompasses range of economic and other
values); Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust, supra note 82, at 1146-55 (same); Pitofsky, The Political
Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1052-58 (1979) (antitrust incorporates broad range of
political values); Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for
Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1232-41 (1977) ("humanistic" goals are part of the antitrust
process).
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adverse price and output effects. 17 7 These values are employed to justify
greater antitrust intervention, not less. 178 Antitrust policies reflecting such
values might therefore pose an even larger, and more genuine, risk to quality
of care, simply because in more cases anticompetitive effects would be found.
If the denial of staff privileges is anticompetitive because it is somehow unfair
to the complaining physician, more of these cases are likely to result in
liability than if the likelihood of adverse price and output effects must be
established. Even per se treatment under the rule against boycotts could be
justified on the grounds of such "unfairness." 179 The relevance of quality-ofcare concerns in such an analysis is not clear. The treatment of quality
concerns applicable under the consumer welfare standard, which focuses
solely on price and output effects, would not be appropriate. If coercion is
grounds for antitrust liability only when price and output effects are unclear
and no efficiencies are created, as some contend, 8 0 improvement of quality
might be sufficient to offset the coercion claims. If restraints that coerce or
impair a way of economic life more in accord with a populist philosophy are to
be condemned without regard to efficiency, as has sometimes been
suggested,' 8 ' why is there reason to believe that a quality-of-care defense is
any more cognizable than the promotion of efficiency?
The argument for a broad quality-of-care defense based on a variety of
non-economic factors, or economic factors other than those employed in
consumer welfare analysis, further assumes that such values can be used to
justify private restraints with adverse competitive effects. While there is
precedent for affirmative use of antitrust to combat coercion, 18 2 or to preserve
opportunities for small businesses, 8 3 there is little precedent for permitting
private enterprises to impose restraints to the same ends. 184 Such
177. See Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 827 (1987); Sullivan, supra
note 82, at 848-53.
178. In addition to articles cited supra note 176, see Fox, Consumer Beware Chicago, supra note 82;
Pitofsky, supra note 177, at 818-23, which make clear that the objection to an antitrust policy focused
solely on efficiency is that it is not sufficiently interventionist.
179. See, e.g., Kissam, supra note 139, at 1197-1202 (espousing a "secondary per se rule" where
self-regulation does not comply with procedural due process). Professor Kissam rests his analysis on
a broad reading of Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). Silver, however, has now
been limited to cases where there is a federal statutory mandate for self-regulation. Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 291-293 (1985) ("If the
challenged action would not amount to a violation of § 1, no lack of procedural protections would
convert it into a per se violation because the antitrust laws do not themselves impose on joint
ventures a requirement of process."). See also Moore v. Boating Indus'y Ass'n, 819 F.2d 693, 695-696
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 160 (1987).
180. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 82, at 849-54.
181. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (Clayton Act); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945) (Sherman Act).
182. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21 (1964).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959). See generally Kauper, The Warren Court and the
Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325, 331-34 (1968).
184. The decisions in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), and
Appalachian Coals Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), might be thought to be decisions
permitting otherwise anticompetitive private restraints because small businesses were benefitted.
But so interpreted these decisions are aberrational. More commonly, those urging a multi-valued
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justifications in effect delegate responsibility for accommodation of these
values to the private sector, in circumstances where private action would
otherwise violate the antitrust laws. A common objection to a multi-valued
antitrust policy is the degree to which it requires courts to make political
decisions, balancing social and economic values without legislative
direction.' 8 5 Placing responsibility for such decisions in the hands of those
whose economic interests are directly at stake and have reason to manufacture
such justifications is even more objectionable and is not in the tradition of
86
antitrust policy.1
However, assume otherwise. What values are protected through a qualityof-care defense that transcends the bounds of economic efficiency? Those
who advocate a multi-valued antitrust policy find such values in its traditions.
These values are familiar and include freedom of opportunity, freedom from
coercion, protection of small business, redistribution of income, and
amelioration of social and political harms caused by corporate concentrations.
None of these concerns relate directly to quality of care or public health and
safety. Antitrust tradition, even if multi-valued, provides no source for or
guide to the development of such a defense.
There is, however, a tradition of self-regulation by professionals in
general, and health care professionals in particular. It is to this tradition that
some might turn to support a broad quality-of-care defense, either by
including values drawn from this tradition among those which a multi-valued
antitrust should accommodate, or by developing a special set of rules for the
professions. The latter. approach builds upon the suggestion in Goldfarb that
professional activities might warrant "different" treatment.
Reliance on this tradition has an obvious appeal. Self-regulation 8 7 of the
professions has a long history.' 8 8 Deference to the tradition of self-regulation
enables judges to leave the resolution of quality issues to those who provide
medical services and are presumably knowledgeable, rather than making
complex decisions about quality themselves.
Self-regulation that does not have adverse price and output effects is
consistent with consumer welfare analysis. The elimination of deception and
the provision of information that informs decisions about quality/cost
tradeoffs is procompetitive, improving the performance of markets. Selfantitrust policy object to such restraints precisely because they delegate decisionmaking authority to
private enterprises. See Pitofsky, supra note 176, at 1056.
185. See R. BORK, supra note 14, at 89-93.
186. See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941) (pattern of selfregulation objectionable in part because "the combination is in reality an extra-governmental
agency" which "trenches upon the power of the national legislature").
187. Self-regulation in this context refers to something more than voluntary standard setting,
which is common in a variety of industries. I refer here to a pattern of self-determined rules enforced
through sanctions imposed by the profession itself. In their severest form, these sanctions may
preclude those not complying with these rules from entering or remaining in the profession. Such
self-regulation may in some instances be directly authorized by the state.

188.

See Rubin, The Legal Web of Professional Regulation, in

(R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980).

REGULATING THE PROFESSIONs

29, 31-35
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regulation may in some instances be the most efficient way to avoid deception
and provide consumers with the accurate information they need to make
correct decisions on their own interest. 89 If this is so, those engaged in selfregulation must be given the range of discretion necessary to carry out these
functions. Competitive restraints reasonably ancillary to the achievement of
these procompetitive ends should be legitimate.
The critical issue here is whether the tradition of self-regulation should be
further accommodated within antitrust doctrine to permit restraints that do
have adverse competitive effects but are motivated by a desire to safeguard
quality of care. Despite the appeal of doing so, antitrust cannot accept selfregulation simply because it has been a long-standing tradition. Professional
associations have relied on the sanctity of self-regulation, for example, to
justify price-fixing.' 90 Yet no one would contend that such self-regulation is
legitimate today. The pattern of such regulation developed long before the
professions were subjected to the antitrust laws. Blind deference to selfregulation as it has existed in the past will simply undo the decision to apply
the antitrust laws at all. It is a conscious decision to maintain the status quo.
Yet there are no standards for accommodating some parts of this tradition to
the exclusion of others.' 9 1 Is there, for example, a reasoned basis for
distinguishing self-regulation directed toward patient care from that targeted
at working conditions or professional image? While distinctions might be
drawn on the basis of public, as opposed to private, benefit, or by reference to
some traditional core of ethical principles, nothing in antitrust's tradition
provides a basis for doing so. These are, in the end, political judgments.
Finally, the claim of a broad patient care defense, whatever its source and
whatever its boundaries, raises two further questions. First, does such a
defense rest on proof that the action in question will in fact improve quality, or
upon a motive to do so? A judicial determination of actual quality effects is
likely to be impossible, for reasons already discussed. Those who would
advocate such a defense will almost invariably be led to suggest that it is the
purpose of enhancing quality that is critical, despite all the vagaries inherent
in its determination. Professional self-regulation with such a purpose is to
receive some special recognition by an antitrust court. ' 92
189. See supra note 107.
190. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
191. Professionalism encompasses a broad range of values and ideals which professional selfregulation may be intended, in whole or in part, to foster. Among these are a belief that
professionals have skills and knowledge not shared by others which, in turn, suggests that the public
is best served if they regulate themselves; the need to assure the trust and confidence of clients and
the public at large; a sense that because of their particular expertise professionals have special
responsibilities which in some cases conflict with financial motives; and a strong sense of professional
autonomy and solidarity. See Kissam, supra note 41, at 5-10.
192. Such special recognition of the traditions of professionalism, including quality of service,
could take one of several forms. Conduct believed to represent such traditions could be held to be
outside the antitrust laws altogether. This approach is reflected in Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp.
Auth., Inc., 789 F.2d 278, 282 n.14 (4th Cir. 1986); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207,
227 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984) (discussed in detail infra text at notes 190-200).
Or recognition of these traditions could lead a court not to apply an otherwise applicable per se rule
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Second, assuming that antitrust is to extend such special recognition, how
is it to do so? Unless the conduct has adverse consumer welfare effects, there
is no reason to consider the question. If it does, are these effects somehow to
be balanced against quality improvement effects? The issue is even more
complex if the quality-of-care defense, derived from some mixture of
efficiency and social values, rests on purpose. Purpose is of some limited
relevance even in consumer welfare analysis, as noted. To go beyond that
assumes that a patient care purpose overrides a showing of adverse
competitive effects.1 9 3 Effects cannot be balanced against purpose.
Presumably price-fixing for the avowed purpose of enhancing quality will not
be tolerated. The purpose criterion then must be more narrowly defined to
include only conduct that has as its purpose improvement of care through
means other than direct elimination of competition among those employing
the restraint. Such a defense would be confined to cases where the adverse
competitive effects are unintended and incidental, and has little to do with
whether quality is actually enhanced or protected against debasement.
Because it does not, there is insufficient public benefit to warrant such an
absolute defense.
The strongest argument in favor of a patient care defense, which
transcends consumer welfare analysis, is that the Supreme Court has itself
recognized it. The observation in Goldfarb that because of "the public service
aspect and other features of the professions," conduct by professionals that in
other contexts would violate the law might "be treated differently,"' 9 4
bolstered by the references in Maricopa to "public service or ethical
norms,"1 9 5 can be read as a direction to accommodate values derived from the
tradition of professional self-regulation in some wholly undefined way. The
Court's definition of "public service" and the particular standards of
professional groups that it would term "ethical norms" are not clear.
Obviously the label put on conduct by the actors themselves is not
determinative. The restraint held unlawful in Professional Engineers was
contained in a code of "ethics." The touchstone could be a non-commercial
9 6
purpose.'
Or one may be required to identify, through the use of history
and tradition, a core of professional standards that may fairly be described as
to some forms of professional self-regulation. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S.
447, 458 (1986) ("[W]e have been slow to condemn rules adopted by professional associations as
unreasonable per se."); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 820-21 (3d Cir. 1984); Kaczanowski v.
Medical Center Hosp. of Vt., 612 F. Supp. 688, 693-694 (D. Vt. 1985); Pontius v. Children's Hosp.,
552 F. Supp. 1352, 1369-370 (W.D. Pa. 1982). An unwillingness to apply a per se rule (particularly
with respect to boycotts) in the setting of professional self-regulation is better explained in terms of
the peculiarities of the markets for professional services. See Kreuzer v. American Academy of
Periodontology, 735 F.2d 1479, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
193. As was held in JVilk, 719 F.2d at 227, discussed infra at note 200.
194. 421 U.S. at 788 n.17.
195. 457 U.S. at 349.
196. Reliance on non-commercial purpose thus would be appropriate in cases involving
professional self-regulation even though inappropriate in antitrust analysis more generally. See supra
notes 140, 152.
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dealing with issues of ethics. 19 7 Assuming that such lines can be drawn, are
such norms simply outside the antitrust laws, or is some balance to be drawn?
The Court does not say.
That Goldfarb can be read in this manner does not mean that it should be.
The Supreme Court has never held that any professional self-regulation
warrants particular dispensation from the antitrust laws. No cases in the
Court have turned on the Goldfarb footnote, which has been consistently
distinguished away. The broad interpretation just suggested is fraught with
doctrinal and practical difficulties and would require judges to make broad
political and social judgments of the type the Court in recent years has
thought inappropriate in antitrust cases.' 9 The Goldfarb reservation can, and
should, be read as nothing more than recognition that markets for
professional services may differ from others in ways that are relevant in
determining competitive effects.' 9 9 The reformulation of the Goldfarb
footnote in Professional Engineers says precisely that. Inadequacy of
information, for example, is a common feature of these markets. Public
service and ethical norms deal, in large part, with problems of information,
deception, or abuse of clients in the choices they are required to make.
Professional standards that remove these imperfections can be upheld even
under a consumer welfare analysis without distorting antitrust to create a
special set of rules for professions.
III
TRANSLATING THEORY INTO REALITY:

A

CASE STUDY

This section examines two decisions, Wilk v. American Medical Association20 0
and Koefoot v. American College of Surgeons,20 1 in which the boundaries of a
quality-of-care, or patient care, defense, if any, are explored in depth. In both
cases, the defendants placed primary reliance on the legitimacy of their efforts
to guard the public in general, and their own patients in particular, against
what, in their perception, was a significant threat to the quality of care
provided. No other decisions discuss the issue as carefully or exhaustively.
Both cases illustrate the practical difficulties confronting judges and juries
197. The Court in Goldfarb and Maricopa gave no hint of how "public service" or "ethical norms"
were to be defined. In Koefoot v. American College of Surgeons, 652 F. Supp. 882, 888 (N.D. Ill.
1987), the court defined "facially legitimate ethical canons" as "rules of professional practice which,
on their face, establish professional standards of care without reference to the economic interests of
the professionals." More commonly courts have referred to such norms as though they know them
when they see them, without further explanation. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 821
(3d Cir. 1984).
198. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) ("an
antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks").
199. Accord Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 6; Havighurst & King, supra note 11, at 170 n.124;
Sullivan & Wiley, supra note 41, at 322-26.

200.

719 F.2d 207 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). Following reversal by the court of

appeals, the case was retried in a bench trial. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465
(N.D. I11. 1987).
201. 652 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ill. 1987). A prior decision on a partial summary judgment motion
appears at 610 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D. I11. 1985).
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when such claims are asserted and they are called upon to evaluate conflicting
scientific claims. Wilk is a decision of the court of appeals. The district court
in Koefoot, governed by the decision in Wilk, was pressed to pursue its
implications while not departing from it. The cases reflect not only theory,
but the translation of that theory into the reality of the courtroom.
The three sections that follow consider Wilk and Koefoot in legal terms and
then apply the consumer welfare analysis described above to both.
A.

Wilk

In Wilk, plaintiff chiropractors asserted that the American Medical
Association and its members conspired among themselves and with other
groups including the American Hospital Association, American College of
Surgeons, American College of Physicians, American College of Radiology,
American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, and the Joint Committee on
Accreditation of Hospitals ("JCAH") to conduct a nationwide boycott of
chiropractic providers. 20 2 While the facts are complex, the central feature of
the alleged boycott was a 1966 AMA resolution stating:
It is the position of the medical profession that chiropractic is an unscientific cult
whose practitioners
lack the necessary training and background to diagnose and treat
20 3
human disease.

The effect of this resolution must be judged in the context of Principle 3 of
the AMA's Principles of Medical Ethics, which states that "a physician should
practice a method of healing founded on a scientific basis" and should not
"voluntarily professionally associate with anyone who violates this principle."
In 1969, the AMA issued an opinion that it was unethical for a physician to
associate professionally with chiropractors. 20 4 Over time, this view was
circulated to a number of other medical groups. At the AMA's urging, JCAH,
seven of whose twenty-one members are appointed by the AMA, adopted a
provision similar to the AMA's 1966 resolution. 20 5 Other groups followed the
AMA's lead. During this period chiropractic was licensed in all fifty states,
and such services were reimbursable under Medicare, Medicaid, and most
private insurance plans. As providers of one form of health care,
chiropractors compete with each other and with some physicians in the
treatment of musculoskeletal problems.
The effect of the actions of the AMA and its co-conspirators was to
discourage cooperation between chiropractors and physicians in the form of
referrals, consultations, and the sharing of clinical and research results, and to
deny chiropractors hospital facilities, including x-ray and laboratory facilities.
Demand for chiropractic services was adversely affected, and the costs of
20 6
chiropractors increased.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

719 F.2d at 211.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id. at 214.
The district court so found. 671 F. Supp. at 1479.
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Throughout the litigation, the defendants insisted that they had acted to
protect the public health and safety from what they believed to be a form of
quackery, a type of treatment without foundation in science. This defense was
the focal point of much of the evidence introduced at the initial trial in which
defendants won a jury verdict, and at a second trial following reversal of the
initial verdict by the court of appeals. As the court of appeals put it:
[M]uch of the trial, and virtually all of the parties' arguments to the jury were a freefor-all between chiropractors and medical doctors, in which the scientific legitimacy of
chiropractic was hotly debated and the comparative intensity of the avarice of the
adversaries was explored.2" 7

The issue was presented to the appellate court on review of jury
instructions at the first trial. The challenged instructions were lengthy, but
provided in substance as follows: In order to find a per se violation, plaintiffs
must show that the concerted refusal was "primarily or in large part for the
purpose of excluding competitors" and that the primary motives of the
defendants "were essentially commercial or economic in nature." Boycotts
"of a non-commercial nature . . ., ones that do not include among their
principal aims the economic purpose of excluding competitors," are to be
2 08
judged under the rule of reason.
Under the rule of reason, "[o]ne of the factors to be considered" is
whether the conduct had an adverse effect on competition, which in turn was
described as a substantial effect in "preventing chiropractors from offering
such services" as the law permits. It is "proper" for a professional association
to formulate conduct standards because such standards benefit the public and
insure that the profession merits public trust. In determining whether a
professional standard violates the rule of reason, it is "necessary" to consider
the "genuineness" of the justification, its reasonableness, its enforcement,
and its effects. While the determination that chiropractors pose "an
impermissible hazard" to public health is for legislative bodies and "cannot be
overturned" by defendants, it is a "difficult question" whether doctors may
limit their relationships with chiropractors "for the purpose of" complying
with standards they deem desirable or necessary. Reasonable ethical
principles "not aimed at" chiropractic may be lawful if they do not have a
"significant and unnecessarily adverse effect" on chiropractors.
In
determining "the reasonableness of the defendants' purposes," consideration
should be given to the "depth and sincerity of their beliefs" that a sharing of
responsibility with chiropractors would pose "substantial hazards" to patients
20 9
and the public welfare.
Struggling with questions such as those already discussed in this paper, the
trial court's instructions can be interpreted in a number of ways. The court of
appeals found the per se instructions erroneous because the characterization
of conduct as per se illegal does not turn on whether the actors' motives were
207.
208.
209.

719 F.2d at 216.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 222-23.
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primarily economic. 21 0 The error was not prejudicial, however, because there
was no evidence that would support a finding of per se illegality, for two
reasons. First, under applicable precedent in the circuit, boycotts are per se
illegal only when they are used to enforce underlying agreements that are
themselves per se illegal. 2 1 1 Second, given evidence of a "patient care"
motive, per se treatment is inappropriate. 21 2 Relying on Goldfarb's
reservations, the court noted that an ethical standard dealing with the role of
scientific method presented sufficiently novel questions to avoid per se
21 3
analysis.
These conclusions are striking by virtue of the juxtaposition of the holding
that the per se instruction was erroneous because per se illegality does not
depend on the presence of a primarily commercial motive and the conclusion
that the conduct in question could not be per se illegal in any event in the
presence of substantial evidence of a patient care motive. If this makes sense,

it must be because a non-commercial motive and a patient care motive as
defined by the courts are not the same. A patient care motive may be noncommercial, but a non-commercial motive does not necessarily relate to
this, as its analysis of the trial court's
patient care. The court means precisely
21 4
rule of reason instructions indicates.
The rule of reason instruction was erroneous because it treated adverse
competitive effect as but one factor in determining the reasonableness of the
agreement. Under Professional Engineers, the sole issue is whether the
agreement promotes competition or suppresses it. Contrary to this standard,
the trial court permitted the jury to consider the reasonableness of the AMA's
standard, measured "in terms of values unrelated to free competition," above
and beyond its assessment of competitive effects. Intent might be of some
relevance in an examination of effects because an anticipated effect is perhaps
more likely than an unanticipated one. The instructions, however, went
2 5
beyond this "severely limited" function of an examination of intent. i

Had the appellate court stopped at this point, its analysis would have been
fully consistent with conventional antitrust doctrine, given that defendants
sought to justify their actions solely in terms of their purpose. But the court
then concluded that in accord with Goldfarb's reservation it was free "to
modify the rule of reason test in a case involving a certain kind of question of
ethics for the medical profession." 2 1 6 The Sherman Act is not indifferent to
the value of permitting physicians to honor "what they perceive" to be
"scientific method," and to uphold that method by not associating with those
210. Id. at 220.
211. See United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 665 F.2d 781, 787-790 (7th Cir.
1981) (en banc). The Seventh Circuit has continued to adhere to this view. See, e.g., Vogel v.
American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984).
212. 719F.2dat 221.
213. Id. at 226.
214. Id. at 225-28.
215. Id. at 225.
216. Id. at 225-26.
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who do not. In the court's words, "a value independent of the values
attributed to unrestrained competition must enter the equation." 2t 7 If the
defendants' dominant motive was a concern over scientific method in the care
of patients, their conduct was reasonable even if competition was restricted.
Specifically, the jury should have been instructed as follows:
The burden of persuasion is on the plaintiffs to show that the effect of Principle 3 and
the implementing conduct has been to restrict competition rather than to promote it.
If the plaintiffs have met this burden, the burden of persuasion is on the defendants to
show: (1) that they genuinely entertained a concern for what they perceive as scientific

method in the care of each person with whom they have entered into a doctor-patient
relationship; (2) that this concern is objectively reasonable; (3) that this concern has
been the dominant motivating factor in defendant's promulgation of Principle 3 and in
the conduct intended to implement it; and (4) that this concern for scientific method in
patient care could not have been adequately satisfied in a manner less restrictive of
18

competition.

2

If these criteria are met, the conduct was not unreasonable. The
instructions given, however, were not sufficiently precise and, in any event,
failed to distinguish between a patient care motive and a public service
motive. The latter, which the court describes as the intention to perform a
public service by using economic pressure to curtail the threat chiropractic
poses to public health, would not justify the restraint. While the patient care
motive might justify the refusal of hospitals to associate with chiropractors in
treatment of patients, economic warfare beyond that in the name of public
2t9
service cannot.
The court in Wilk thus avoids the need to balance social gains against the
adverse effects caused by restraining competition. If defendants' conduct fell
within the patient care motive, as described, the conduct was reasonable
without regard to the magnitude of its price and output effects. Within
narrow limits, the public benefits of self-regulation are to be preferred. Nor
does its approach require courts to evaluate quality of care directly. By
formulating its standard in terms of purpose, it is defendants' beliefs that are
critical (constrained only by the requirement that those beliefs have a
reasonable, objective basis). This is not a defense that rests on a
determination that the public is benefitted because quality in fact improved.
Wilk rests squarely on the Goldfarb reservation, and is verbally inconsistent
with consumer welfare analysis. At no point in fashioning its justification does
the court attempt to evaluate the evidence presented by defendants in
economic terms. With little guidance from the Supreme Court, and no roots
in economic analysis, the court attempted with great care to formulate new
standards of its own, consistent with what it perceived to be values drawn
from a tradition of professional self-regulation. The distinction drawn
217. Id.at 227.
218. Id. The court found that the jury was properly instructed on the applicability of the first
amendment to the AMA's activities directed toward Congress, state legislatures, and state and
federal administrative agencies, and was prepared to assume that the jury found all of its political
activity protected. Id. at 228-30.
219. Id. at 228.
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between the patient care and public service motives reflects the court's views
as the core of traditional ethical concerns, the protection of the physicianpatient relationship. It also must be viewed as an effort to limit severely the
scope of the justification, in recognition of the fact that the court was
departing from what it itself described as the normal antitrust standard.
The public service/patient care distinction is hard to grasp. A refusal to
associate with chiropractors may be justified by the patient care motive. The
AMA's attempts to block licensing of chiropractors, however motivated by
concerns over the public health, cannot be so justified (although such actions
were within first amendment protection in any event). Yet by eliminating
chiropractors the defendants would solve their associational concern. The
distinction may well make sense in measuring effects. The adverse
competitive effects are clearly greater if chiropractic is eliminated than if
chiropractors are tolerated but handicapped. But the court did not put the
distinction in such terms. The distinction becomes even more difficult once it
is understood what was not at issue in Wilk. Plaintiff-chiropractors did not
seek AMA membership. Nor did they in this litigation seek full hospital staff
privileges. Nothing in the case implicates the right of a physician, or
integrated unit of physicians, unilaterally to decline association with
chiropractors. The right of a particular hospital to eschew such association
was unquestioned. 2 20 The issue was simply whether physicians could
eliminate such association by agreement among otherwise independent units.
It is the agreement, not the right of individuals to pick their own associates,
which must be justified. The AMA action might provide information to
physicians, informing their individual judgments. However, the alleged
agreement went further. The agreement protected the relationship between a
doctor and patient by assuring that others did not associate with chiropractors.
If a patient care motive justifies such an agreement, it is because of a concern
for the public generally.
Whether a jury, instructed as the court in Wilk directs, could understand
these distinctions and solve the practical problems of identifying a dominant
motive will not be learned from Wilk itself. On remand, the case was tried
without a jury. The trial court concluded that while the defendants
entertained a genuine concern for scientific method in the care of their
patients and that this concern was the dominant factor motivating its actions,
they failed to establish that as applied to chiropractors it was objectively
reasonable. Moreover, the court was unconvinced that there were no less
restrictive means to the same end. Specifically, the court saw no reason why
an educational campaign would not achieve the AMA's desires. The patient
22
care justification was therefore rejected. '
220. Furthermore, the court indicated that individual physicians, and "two or three" physicians
providing services as a team, would be free to refuse association with particular chiropractors in
treating individual patients. Id. at 226.
221. Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Il. 1987).
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Koefoot

Over half of all board certified surgeons in the country are members of the
American College of Surgeons ("ACS"). ACS plays a significant role in board
certification, and in the accreditation of hospitals. 22 2 Three of twenty-one
members of the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals are appointed
by ACS. Board certification or status as an ACS fellow is required to hold staff
privileges in hospitals accredited by JCAH. ACS also is involved in medical
223
education and a variety of other activities.
The "itinerant surgery" rule of the ACS prohibits:
[tjhe performance of surgical operations (except on patients whose chances of
recovery would be prejudiced by removal to another hospital) under circumstances in
which the responsibility for diagnosis or care of the patient is delegated to another
224
who is not fully qualified to undertake it.

The effect of the rule is that ACS surgeons may delegate responsibility for
post-operative care only to other surgeons.
Dr. Koefoot is a general surgeon who performs surgery in three hospitals
in Grand Island, Nebraska, and in several community hospitals some twenty
minutes away. He gives post-operative care to his patients in Grand Island,
but delegates responsibility for such care to non-surgeon general
practitioners in the community hospitals. After his expulsion from ACS for
violating the itinerant surgery rule, he filed an antitrust suit against ACS,
attacking the rule as a form of market allocation used by ACS members to
block entry, as a boycott of non-surgeons, and as a tie-in between surgery and
post-operative care. He was joined in his suit by three physicians to whom he
delegated post-operative care and three hospitals where he performed
surgery. ACS has defended the rule as a legitimate ethical canon adopted to
2 25
enhance the quality of care provided surgical patients.
Summary judgment in favor of defendants was denied. The rule on its
face could work to protect local surgeons from the competition of visiting
surgeons through refusals by local surgeons to provide post-operative care.
In addition, the rule could eliminate competition between surgeons and nonsurgeons in post-operative care and injure competition between local and
community hospitals. Evidence with respect to motive was in conflict.
At this writing, the case has not been tried. But in ruling on a series of
motions in limine, the trial court held that the itinerant surgery violation was
not a per se violation and set an agenda for the trial under the rule of reason.
A "facially legitimate ethical canon," defined as a rule of professional practice
that establishes standards of care "without reference to the economic interests
2 26
of professionals," is not per se illegal.
222. For example, ACS is a member of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals
("JCAH"). See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 671 F. Supp. 1465, 1490 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
223. Koefoot v. American College of Surgeons, 610 F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (N.D. 11. 1985).
224. Koefoot, 652 F. Supp. at 884.
225. Id. at 887.
226. Id. at 888-89.
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The trial court then dealt with the relevance of evidence offered by ACS to
establish (1) that their motive was to safeguard the quality of patient care, and
(2) that the practice of itinerant surgery was in fact harmful. As to the first,
the court found Wilk's patient care motive doctrine inapplicable, because ACS
surgeons, other surgeons, and non-surgeons shared the same basic training
and belief in scientific method. 2 2 7 Moreover, while Wilk was not overruled by
the later Supreme Court decisions inJefferson Parish2 28 and Indiana Federationof
Dentists,2 29 those decisions do suggest that any extension of Wilk would be
improper. Motive evidence is relevant and admissible, but only for the limited
purpose of evaluating effect. Evidence that itinerant surgery was in fact
harmful is relevant only to establish ACS's intent. If the practice is harmful, it
is somewhat more probable that patient care was ACS's motive. So proof of
actual harm is some evidence of intent, which in turn is some evidence of
effect. Because harm evidence is of limited relevance, and is a type of
evidence that is likely to be prejudicial, the court concluded that its quality
23 0
and quantity must be severely limited.
In a second set of motions, ACS revived its efforts to focus the trial on the
issue of harm to patients. 23 ' Accepting the premise that the sole inquiry was
anticompetitive effect, ACS recast its arguments in competitive terms. First, if
the rule actually improves quality, it is procompetitive. This argument, which
would apparently create a broad quality-of-care defense upon proof that the
conduct prevented harm to patients, was rejected as inconsistent with the
theory underlying Wilk. 232 Second, ACS contended that ACS membership

functions as a "seal of approval relied upon by consumers seeking a higher
standard of patient care." To establish this procompetitive informational
effect, ACS asserted that it was necessary to establish that itinerant surgery is
actually harmful. Only if it is can the information be valuable to
2 33
consumers.
The court did not reject the information argument. The ACS membership
label could enable consumers to find a desirable service more efficiently, and
therefore be procompetitive. But whether care is actually improved is not the
issue. ACS need only establish that consumers, for whatever reason, desire
post-operative care by surgeons. If consumers prefer local hospitalization
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 890-91.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
Koefoot, 652 F. Supp. at 896.
Following the trial court's initial rulings on a series of motions in limine, rulings which

sharply restricted the ability of defendants to introduce evidence of harms to patients resulting from

the practice of itinerant surgery, defendants filed a motion to "clarify" in which they again sought to
expand the admissibility of such evidence. Opinions on both sets of motions appear together at 652

F. Supp. 882. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that defendants sought to use such evidence to
unduly influence the jury. This was precisely what the district court was trying to avoid. See 652 F.
Supp. at 893.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 902.
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without such care that is their choice to make. The market, "not judges, juries
23
or even doctors," will determine the best care.

4

The insistence by the court in Koefoot upon a singleminded inquiry into
effect is consistent with consumer welfare analysis. Intention is relevant only
as it illuminates effect.
Uncomfortable with the Wilk patient-care-motive justification, the court
confined it to cases involving allegations of pure quackery. It is apparent that
the court was determined not to make judgments about the medical
consequences of itinerant surgery and feared that evidence about harm would
distract the jury from its assignment to focus solely on competitive efforts.
The court's opinions are clearly those of a trial judge trying to keep a trial
within manageable bounds, and to translate a rather complex theoretical
structure into the practicalities of presenting evidence. 235
As part of the process of pre-trial preparation, the focus in Koefoot has
narrowed down from the assertion of a broad quality-of-care defense to a
focus on the informational effects of ACS membership. This, as we shall see,
is where the focus should be. Wilk's patient care motive was a distraction, but
only that.
C.

Consumer Welfare Analysis as Applied to Wilk and Koefoot

With the exception of its recognition of the patient care motive, Wilk
proceeds on the correct assumption that antitrust outcomes depend on an
analysis of effects. While the court does not embrace the concept that
antitrust is concerned solely with economic efficiency, nothing in its opinion
suggests that it thinks otherwise. The same may be said of the opinions in
Koefoot. The decisions are therefore consistent with the general pattern
236
emerging from the Supreme Court's opinions in antitrust health care cases.
Assuming that these decisions should be governed by the same consumer
welfare analysis applied in all other antitrust cases, how are the principles
already discussed to be applied?
The alleged adverse effects of the chiropractor boycott occurred through
the refusal of physicians, radiologists, and hospitals to associate in any way
with chiropractors. This refusal was not the result of individual, informed
decisionmaking by separate units acting in their own economic interests.
Rather, it was brought about by an agreement with which each was required
to abide under the threat of discipline or denial of accreditation. 23 7 On its
face, the boycott did not affect price competition among physicians, among
234. Id. at 904. The court further noted that while learned professions may be somewhat
different, in the Supreme Court "the balance has consistently gone to the side of free market
choices." Id.
235. The court was particularly concerned that so-called "harm" evidence was likely to be
prejudicial in a jury trial. 652 F. Supp. at 893.
236. See supra text at 281-92.
237. Apart from the agreement among its members reflected in the AMA's own activities, the trial
court also found that the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons and the American College of
Radiologists were also participants in the conspiracy. Parallel actions by theJCAH and the American
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radiologists, or among hospitals, although it did eliminate competition within
each of these groups for business through referrals or use of services by
chiropractors. The primary effect was to increase the costs of chiropractors,
and to otherwise handicap them in the delivery of services. 23 8 Competition

between chiropractors and physicians was significantly reduced. Consumers
were deprived of a service they apparently desired. The trial court did not
directly examine price and output effects, and it is not clear that it could have
done so. 23 9

It is not unreasonable to conclude that the elimination or

handicapping of an alternative method of competition would have adverse
effects within the market in which physicians and chiropractors actually
240
competed.
The itinerant surgery rule appears less likely to have adverse price and
output effects. On its face, the rule prevents ACS from dealing with a group
of physicians who might otherwise compete in providing post-operative care.
It is this refusal to deal with a group of competitors who are not in the same
specialty which creates at least a superficial resemblance between the conduct
in Wilk and Koefoot and distinguishes these cases from a number of others.
Whether this refusal might have adverse effects will depend on a careful
examination of market power and pricing structures within particular markets.
ACS surgeons may lack power over price. 24 ' Itinerant surgery may offer no
cost advantages. Surgeons not providing post-operative care might be able to
charge a higher price for surgery alone, with the result that the price to the
consumer for the entire procedure might be unchanged. Other adverse
effects are alleged. Competition between rural and metropolitan hospitals is
allegedly reduced. Local surgeons are protected against visiting surgeons; all
they need do is refuse to provide post-operative care. These effects cannot be
inferred. For example, that the rule could be used to benefit local surgeons
does not mean that it has been. Nor is it clear why surgeons would want a rule
that makes it difficult for rural hospitals to compete.
College of Physicians were undertaken independently. 671 F. Supp. at 1471. Several other
professional organizations named as defendants settled prior to trial.
Hospitals allowing use of facilities by chiropractors would "very probably" be denied JCAH
accreditation, and hospitals acted accordingly. See 719 F.2d at 214. While JCAH's standards were
found to have been independently adopted, the threat of a denial of accreditation was well-known to
the AMA and was a fact relevant in assessing the effects of the AMA's actions.
238. See 671 F. Supp. at 1479.
239. The trial court held that given the nature of the AMA's actions and its power in the market,
specific proof of price and output effects was not required. Id.
240. In hospital staff privileges cases, for example, the only parties directly involved are those to
whom staff privileges are denied; staff benefits are not generally conditioned upon the refusal of staff
members to deal with third parties. The same is generally true in accreditation and certification
cases. But in [Vilk and Koefool the rules under attack required non-dealing with others. In this
respect, these cases more closely resemble classic, secondary boycott cases like Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). Cases involving secondary pressure have traditionally been
particularly suspect. See, e.g., Heidt, supra note 148, at 1586-95.
241. Markets for general surgery services are presumably relatively local. Whether ACS surgeons
have the ability to raise price significantly will rest to a substantial degree on the number of non-ACS
surgeons in the market with access to surgical facilities.
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The rule does not adversely affect competition between ACS fellows and
other surgeons, except to the extent ACS status is valued by purchasers of their
services. Hospitals may prefer to extend staff privileges only to ACS fellows,
but accreditation standards do not require them to do so. Consultation
between ACS fellows and other surgeons is not prohibited. Board certified
surgeons who do not follow ACS standards may actually have a competitive
advantage over their ACS counterparts in their ability to make alternative
24 2
arrangements for post-operative care.

Assuming that the likelihood of adverse competitive effects is established
in both cases, are there other economic factors relating to quality of care that
might be presented in justification? Putting to one side Wilk's patient-caremotive defense, both Wilk and Koefoot relegate intent to its appropriate
subordinate role. If adverse effects are established, intent is no longer
relevant. The focus shifts, then, to issues of productive efficiency, generation
of market information, and the enhancement of rivalry through product
competition and reputation for quality.
In neither Wilk nor Koefoot is there any integration which might result in
efficiencies in the delivery of specific services to consumers. In both cases, the
setting of standards by a central professional group could reduce the costs
that would otherwise be incurred by physicians and hospitals in securing
information, although this seems more likely in Koefoot than in Wilk, as
discussed below. What of reduction in potential liability costs, or costs of
liability insurance? Physicians, radiologists, and hospitals who collaborate
with or perform services for chiropractors might be held liable for
misdiagnosis or faulty treatment that chiropractors provide. Chiropractors, as
a class, might create a higher risk of liability than other groups with whom
collaboration is permitted. Conceivably, surgeons' liability potential might
increase if post-operative care is placed in the hands of non-surgeons. But
such concerns, however justified, and however appropriate as the basis for
individual decisionmaking, cannot justify agreements by entire medical
specialties not to deal with such groups. Provision of information concerning
liability risk should be sufficient to enable each provider to make its own
affiliation decisions.
If the conduct challenged in these cases is procompetitive, it is because it
provides information and advice, or enhances competition in terms of product
or reputation as competitors seek advantages over their rivals. The district
court in Koefoot perceived this point in focusing on the information value of
the ACS "seal of approval."

243

Credentialing by professional groups enhances competition by supplying
information and advice in markets where they are lacking. 24 4 Those familiar
242. Just as Dr. Koefoot himself may have had such an advantage in using non-surgeons for postoperative care.
243. 652 F. Supp. at 904.
244. See generally Havighurst and King, supra note 11, at 132-38; Kissam, supra note 4 1,at 60-65.
Credentialing standards are often based more on opinions and beliefs than hard scientific fact.
Professor Kissam has urged that the first amendment provides the basis for curtailing the application
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with ACS standards, for example, know without further inquiry that ACS
fellows meet those standards. Others may rely on ACS credentials as a form
of advice. While such information might be otherwise available, the
credentials provide it at lower cost. Assuming that these credentials are
competitively significant to those who possess them, and that they in fact
represent legitimate concerns over medical care, such credentials provide
incentives for those seeking them to improve their performance.
Adverse competitive effects cannot be found in the denial of such
credentials alone. Credentialing those who do not conform to the standards
adopted would dilute the meaning of the credentials and, in some cases,
would be deceptive.2

45

The refusal to grant credentials is a necessary

concomitant to any credentialing program. There is no less restrictive
alternative apparent. The focus must be on the competitive effects of the
rules themselves, not on the fact that they are enforced by denial or expulsion.
If credentials provide information consumers value, rightly or wrongly,
they provide a competitive advantage to those possessing them. Professional
associations such as ACS must be viewed as joint ventures, created and
financed by members precisely because they obtain that advantage and
enhance their position over their rivals. 2 46 The incentive for the creation and
continuance of such ventures rests in the desire of some to differentiate
themselves from others. While those not possessing these credentials are in a
sense harmed, they are harmed because consumers and others value the
information such credentials provide. This harm is caused by the choices
consumers make. It is not the result of any restraint, but of the competitive
24 7
process itself.

Credentialing is not always procompetitive. A credentialing standard
which simply fixes prices or divides markets is not lawful. Other standards
may so reduce competition among those within the association that the
information they impart may be overborne by the price and output effects
which result. 24 8 But such effects must be sharply distinguished from the
of the antitrust laws to credentialing programs which provide information and advice, and has set
forth in some detail his view of the appropriate first amendment analysis. See Kissam, supra note 47,
at 40-48; Kissam, supra note 41, at 62-64. There are, of course, certain types of lobbying activities
that may be directed toward the adoption of quality-of-care standards by governmental bodies (and
perhaps even private standard setting groups) which are within the protection of the first
amendment, see infra note 261, but like Professor Havighurst, I do not believe that reliance on the
first amendment is necessary in most cases; the procompetitive effects of credentialing can be
adequately recognized in more traditional antitrust terms. See Havighurst and King, supra note 11, at
194.
245. For example, one of the objections to "grandfathering" in credentialing, i.e., the practice of
not requiring those already credentialed to conform to newly adopted standards, is that such
standards no longer generate procompetitive information and may in fact deceive those who take the
credentials as a representation of conformity with standards currently in effect. See Havighurst &
King, Private Credentialingof Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective (Part 2), 9 AM. J.L. & MED.
263, 302 (1983).
246. See Havighurst & King, supra note 11, at 136, 176.
247. Id. at 133, 155, 176.
248. For example, a trade association or certifying body comprised of competitors might adopt a
set of product standards that eliminates virtually all forms of product differentiation, or removes
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effects felt by those outside the association; these outside effects are most likely
simply the reaction of the market to information. Association membership
and credentialing could be such a competitive advantage that those without
them cannot effectively compete at all. There are circumstances where the
outside effects felt through the exclusion of others might restrict output. The
denial of credentials might be a vehicle to raise rivals'

costs. 2

4

9

The

association's credentials might then be characterized as akin to an "essential
facility."' 2 50 The presence of a significant number of competitors without
them would suggest otherwise.
The itinerant surgery rule does not preclude surgical practice by non-ACS
surgeons. Nor does it prevent ACS surgeons from referring patients to nonACS surgeons. JCAH hospital accreditation standards do not require that
hospitals grant surgical privileges only to ACS fellows. Seemingly, decisions
by hospitals, patients, and other providers to utilize ACS surgeons are based
simply on the information value ACS credentials provide. Non-ACS surgeons
are at a competitive disadvantage, but that alone does not establish adverse
competitive effect. Unless the rule is sufficiently arbitrary to mislead
consumers, or conveys no information that may be relevant to a significant
number of them, the harm allegedly caused competing surgeons results
simply from the reliance on accurate information, that is, that ACS fellows
provide their own post-surgical care, and thus informs the competitive
process. Non-ACS surgeons also are likely to lose referrals from ACS fellows,
and other physicians as well. Rural hospitals may be disadvantaged in
competing with metropolitan hospitals because patients desire surgery by
ACS fellows, or because such fellows cannot perform surgery in these
hospitals without delegating responsibility for post-operative care. But absent
from the market a variation of the product traditionally sold at a particularly low price (e.g., seconds).
Such standardization might have significant direct price and output effects, or might facilitate tacit
collusion or other interdependent behavior having such effects. See 7 P. AREEDA, supra note 48, at
373, 386 (1986). In such cases, the focus is on the elimination of competition among those parties to
the agreement, rather than upon the exclusion of third parties. This distinction between "inside"
and "outside" effects underlies a number of recent cases reexamining boycott doctrine. See, e.g.,
Vogel v. American Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984).
249. See Heidt, supra note 148, at 1533-35, 1572. In some cases, the target may be a group of
rivals whose costs and prices are lower than the defendants'. Their elimination, or an increase in
their costs, may have adverse price and output effects, if such rivals are unable to duplicate the
defendants' activity. Professor Heidt suggests that the AMA's actions against chiropractors at issue
in Wilk may be explained on this basis. Id. at 1574.
250. The essential facility doctrine is derived from United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St.
Louis, 224 U.S. 383 (1912), a case dealing with a so-called bottleneck monopoly. While the doctrine
is poorly defined, it is generally described as having the following elements: (1)control of an
essential facility by a monopolist (or a group that collectively has monopoly power); (2) the denial to
a competitor of access to the facility; (3) inability on the part of the competitor reasonably to
duplicate the facility; and (4) the feasibility of access. MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708
F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). For an extended discussion, see
Note, Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 441 (1983). The
decision in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
298 (1985), while not put in terms of the essential facility doctrine, uses some of its language in
holding that the per se rule against boycotts should not be applied to expulsion from a buying
cooperative absent a showing that defendants had market power "or unique access to a business
element necessary for effective competition."
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evidence of some additional agreement between ACS and hospitals, these are
informational harms.
The ban on itinerant surgery also has a direct effect on competition among
ACS fellows. Each is precluded from competing with other surgeons (ACS or
otherwise) by offering patients a choice as to post-operative care. ACS fellows
are thus precluded from offering patients an alternative product which may, in
some cases, be less costly. Competition between ACS fellows and nonsurgeons with respect to post-operative care is also eliminated as a result, a
fact that may lead to the erroneous conclusion that this should be considered
a per se illegal boycott.
The effect of the rule is to standardize the product offered by ACS
surgeons. They provide only a surgery/post-operative care package. The
decision not to compete among themselves in this respect is not simply an
individual reaction to information. It results from agreement. But all
credentialing necessarily involves some standardization; without it,
credentialing would be meaningless. Physicians forgo an element of rivalry to
obtain the benefits of credentials, as is true to a degree with any joint venture.
Credentials are not severable. One cannot be an ACS fellow for one patient
but not for another. If accreditation is procompetitive, and the specific rule in
question bears a rational relationship to its informational function, limitations
on rivalry that necessarily result must also be legitimate. The mere fact that
the rule results in a refusal to utilize the services of others who might
otherwise compete cannot determine the outcome.
Where consumers have no choice, as they might not if all surgeons were
ACS fellows, the provision of information might be irrelevant, and the
anticompetitive effects of the rule more severe. But choices apparently exist.
A standard that clearly deceives, or bears no rational relationship to the
informational and advice functions of credentialing, may be competitively
unjustified. Finally, a credentialing standard that directly limits price
competition or allocates markets among those who are members of the
association cannot be viewed as procompetitive. These are the issues on
which inquiry must focus.
The actions taken by the AMA against chiropractors may seem to bear a
superficial resemblance to the ACS itinerant surgery rule. In each case, the
rule under attack limited competition between members and alternative
providers (surgeons and non-surgeons, physicians and chiropractors) by
prohibiting members from dealing with them. But the chiropractor boycott is
significantly different. The itinerant surgery rule precluded use of nonsurgeons only for post-operative care. It did not prevent referrals or other
forms of collaboration, and did not result itself in any denial of facilities or
services to non-surgeons. The AMA boycott went much further in all these
respects. Even if there was some informational element in these actions, their
effect went well beyond those resulting from information alone.
Moreover, membership in the AMA is not a credential that provides
information in the sense specialty credentialing does. Unlike other
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credentialing, the non-affiliation rule provides little information about the
qualifications, competence, or services of physicians. It is unlikely that
consumers, physicians, or insurers rely on AMA membership to differentiate
physicians from chiropractors. Avoidance of confusion between them might
justify a refusal to admit chiropractors to AMA membership, but this was not
at issue; chiropractors did not seek to be AMA members. Some consumers
might want to know that physicians do not collaborate with chiropractors, but
AMA membership is not likely to be taken as certification that particular
physicans satisfy standards of this sort. In addition, the non-affiliation rule is
so broad as to bear no rational relationship to any informational function
performed by AMA membership. It effectively denied radiological and
laboratory services, and sharing of research and clinical experiences, 2 5' to
chiropractors, matters which appear irrelevant to consumer choice. The rule
also resulted in denial of access to hospital facilities. Even without the threat
that accreditation will be revoked by JCAH, such facilities are likely to be
denied because physicians on hospital staffs are bound not to collaborate with
While this might be characterized as "non-verbal
chiropractors.
communication" of information, 25 2 that is, a signal through denial of facilities
that chiropractic is not a science, or is harmful, its effects are more than
informational. The ability of consumers to make choices based upon all
available information is impaired.
Finally, the AMA acted in conjunction with a number of other professional
associations, which at the urging of the AMA adopted similar non-affiliation
standards. 2 53 This extended the adverse effects on chiropractic, and also
assured that information and advice given consumers by the non-affiliation
rule was uniform. The availability of competing information sources serves as
a check on its accuracy and serves to enhance consumer choice.2 54 The
agreements found in Wilk, however, eliminated competition among otherwise
independent information sources.
The AMA non-affiliation rule and related actions cannot be justified on
informational grounds. Nor can it be characterized as procompetitive because
it enhances rivalry through protection of reputation for quality. Physicians do
have a legitimate competitive interest in reputation. And particular physicians
could well decide that their competitive stance would be damaged by
251. Whether a given hospital might deny chiropractors access to radiological facilities, and
whether a particular group of radiologists might refuse to associate with chiropractors, are different
questions. Radiologists (and hospitals) might increase their liability risks if they fail to take
reasonable steps to assure proper treatment of diseases misdiagnosed by chiropractors but which
they detect. The avoidance of such liability might justify a refusal of access. Compare Calvani &
James, Antitrust Law and the Practice of ledicine, 2 J. LEG. MED. 75, 89 (1980), with Denying Hospital
Privileges, supra note 6, at 1219, 1243; Health Professionals' Access to Hospitals, supra note 7, at 1191-95.
252. In IVilk, the AMA's economic expert advanced this argument, which was rejected as
"speculative," particularly given the lack of evidence of any confusion between chiropractors and
physicians in the eyes of the public. 671 F. Supp. at 1479.
253. See supra note 237.
254. See Havighurst & King, supra note 245, at 264-66. In this study, the authors deal at length
with the need to preserve a competitive market in the provision of information and opinion relating
to health care.
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affiliation with chiropractors. But an agreement not to affiliate could be so
justified only if a physician's ability to compete is impaired if other physicians
affiliate with chiropractors. If such affiliation is harmful to reputation,
however, affiliation by others would appear to enhance the competitive
posture of those who reject it.
In sum, the itinerant surgery rule might be justified on informational
grounds. It does not appear that the AMA actions with respect to chiropractic
can be similarly justified.
IV
QUALITY-OF-CARE CONSIDERATIONS IN OTHER CASES

This section will examine briefly, within the framework developed in Part
II, the relevance of quality-of-care justifications advanced in a variety of other
cases. The treatment here is intended simply to highlight these issues in the
setting of conduct frequently subjected to antitrust attack.
A.

Agreements with Respect to Price

A group of providers may agree on the price to be charged consumers for
particular services, or on the levels of reimbursement to be demanded from
insurers or from government payors such as Medicaid. 25 5 In justification, they
assert that higher prices are necessary to assure quality of patient care
generally, or for particular classes of patients, such as the indigent.
Competition over price or reimbursement rates that are too low will cause
providers to cut corners, with a corresponding quality reduction. Care for the
poor will decline, the argument goes, unless such care is cross-subsidized by
higher prices for all others. These assertions are squarely contrary to
Professional Engineers,2 5 6 and find no support in consumer welfare analysis.

Such agreements are presumed to have adverse price and output effects.
They provide neither significant efficiencies nor information that facilitates
consumer choice. There is, in any event, no assurance that quality will
increase.
Provider boycotts of private and public insurers who reduce or refuse to
25 7
increase reimbursement rates present the same quality-of-care issues.
When such boycotts are the means of implementing an underlying price
agreement, they should be treated as price-fixing agreements and cannot be
justified in quality-of-care terms.
Not all provider boycotts of insurers are in this category. Such boycotts
may be an effort to bargain (or protest) over matters other than price, as was
255. See, e.g., United States v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028 (D.N.D. 1986);
Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983); Raup, supra note 10.
256. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), discussed supra
at text accompanying notes 42-47.
257. See cases cited supra note 10.
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arguably the case in Indiana Federation of Dentists. 2 58 Even in some cases where
reimbursement is at issue, price and output effects may be unclear; while the
boycott appears to be price-related, there may be no real underlying price
agreement. Assuming that adverse effects are either proven or properly
presumed, none of the procompetitive effects considered in consumer welfare
analysis are present. Naked concerted refusals to deal provide neither
efficiencies nor information to consumers that cannot be provided in a less
restrictive way.
The collective refusal of providers to participate in insurance programs,
even when based upon considerations of price, may raise serious questions
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.2 5 9 These boycotts may be viewed as a
political protest designed to pressure legislative or executive bodies to alter
the insurance programs that they finance or administer (such as Medicaid) or
over which they have regulatory authority. Providers will assert that they are
simply lobbying. The Noerr issues do not relate directly to quality of care and
are outside the scope of this study. 260 But it should be noted that a boycott of
insurers, either government or private,2 6' goes well beyond the collective
submission of information and expression of views in the political process.
The adverse effects are not the result of the reaction of government or the
public to such views but flow directly from the boycott agreement. The
invocation of Noerr in these circumstances requires that the boycott agreement
be characterized as a form of protected, non-verbal communication, a
26 2
considerable extension of the doctrine as generally applied.
258. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). Price was only indirectly involved in
the dentists' withholding of x-rays. While the dentists complained that they would not be fully
reimbursed by insurers for services rendered, they did not attempt to negotiate rates or otherwise
directly deal with price.
259. The Aoerr-Pennington doctrine exempts from the antitrust laws even political activity, even
when engaged in for anticompetitive purposes, to influence legislative and other political officials to
carry out acts with anticompetitive effects. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The
exemption, which is grounded in the first amendment, applies to efforts to influence not only
legislators but administrative bodies as well, but it does not protect actions where this political end is
a "sham" to disguise conduct directed towards competitors. California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
260. The applicability of Noerr-Pennington in this boycott setting is discussed in detail in Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 856 F.2d 226, 241-50 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1741
(1989); United States v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass'n, 640 F. Supp. 1028, 1040-43 (D.N.D. 1986);
Michigan State Medical Soc'y, 101 F.T.C. 191 (1983). In each of these cases, professional service
providers sought without success to bring boycotts targeted at government reimbursers within NoerrPennington, although the court in Superior Court concluded that first amendment concerns were
sufficient to require proof of market power.
261. Because Noerr-Pennington protects actions to influence public officials, boycotts of private
insurers would appear to fall outside the exemption. In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1931 (1988), the Court held that actions taken by firms to influence industry
standard-setting bodies to adopt standards that imposed handicaps on their rivals did not fall within
Noerr-Pennington, in cases where the standards adopted are in turn relied upon by government
agencies.
262. See, e.g., Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
22,373, at 23, 457-58 (1986), rev d and remanded, 856 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
1741 (1989).
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The Collective Withholding of Information

A single business enterprise may disclose or withhold information as it
sees fit. But an agreement among competitors to withhold information
relevant to buyers in making quality-of-care decisions may violate the
Sherman Act. In Professional Engineers,26 3 an agreement not to quote prices
was held unlawful. A collective refusal to furnish x-rays to insurers was
condemned in Indiana Federation of Dentists.264 Agreements not to advertise

prices have been similarly treated.2 65 Under what circumstances, if any, might
such agreements be justified on the ground that buyers are unable to evaluate
the information withheld and are thus likely to be misled?
Suppose a group of hospitals agrees not to disclose information about
mortality rates in each. The agreement produces no efficiencies. But the
hospitals will contend that such information is inherently misleading, and that
the prevention of such misinformation is procompetitive. They will invoke
the tradition of self-regulation designed to prevent deception.
Each hospital may elect not to release mortality rate data, or to release it
with any explanation it deems appropriate. But here each has given up its
independent judgment. The perceived need for agreement suggests that such
information is competitively significant. Each agrees in order to gain
assurances that others will not release the data, recognizing that release by
one will pressure others to respond. The argument advanced to justify
withholding recognizes the competitive significance of the information.
Self-regulation directed toward deception is competitively legitimate. But
the issue here is not whether an association may discipline members who utter
untruths. Mortality data are not false. The argument rests instead on the
proposition that an entire category of truthful information cannot be
understood by buyers, even if accompanied by explanations of its meaning.
Buyer judgment being unreliable, decisions about such data should be made
by the hospitals themselves.
The proffered justification focuses on the lack of sophistication in
individual consumers and ignores the relevance of such information to others
in the marketplace. In many cases, consumers delegate decisions about
hospital care to physicians or other providers who are more able to evaluate
data of this sort. The information is also relevant to insurers, who are not
likely to misjudge its significance. Even if the agreement contemplates the
release of the data to these groups and denies it only to the public at large, the
argument that there are categories of information that consumers are
incapable of understanding is simply contrary to the premises underlying the
competitive model, which assumes the competence of consumers to process
available information. ProfessionalEngineers, Indiana Federationof Dentists, and a
263. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
264. FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
265. See United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1961); Federal
Prescription Serv., Inc. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 484 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (D.D.C. 1980),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 663 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982).
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number of first amendment commercial speech cases 2 6 6 rest on this basic

proposition. These cases do not entirely foreclose the possibility that the
assumption-the consumer's capability of assimilating accurate informationmay be disproven on the record in a particular case. However, judicial
skepticism of such claims is manifest,2 67 and it is hard to imagine such a case.
This skepticism is well-founded. The proposition that consumers are best
served when full, accurate information is available is too basic to overcome
lightly. The presence of competing sources of information, which agreements
to withhold eliminate, assures the availability of information and enhances the
likelihood that it is accurate. Moreover, by controlling information, providers
2 68 It
may also exert a direct control over competition from "outsiders."
cannot be assumed that providers act solely in the public interest. Finally,
even in those cases where government has regulated the content or
availability of information relevant to consumer choice, it has generally
required more, not less. 2 69 The tendency of truthful information to mislead
has not been corrected by withholding it altogether.
C.

Staff Privileges and Access to Hospital Facilities

For most health care providers, staff privileges or, in some cases, a more
limited form of access to hospital facilities, are necessary for survival in the
marketplace. Without such access, providers are unable to render some
services economically and must refer patients to others. Patients may be lost.
Others may elect not to use providers without hospital access. Because those
already having staff privileges play a significant role in granting or denying
such privileges to others, they could use the process to limit competition from
alternative providers or other comparable providers. The interest of hospital
administrators may conflict with that of physicians on the staff and provide
some check on their ability to restrict competition. In a competitive world,
while physicians may desire to limit the grant of staff privileges to
competitors, hospital administrators may want more physicians on the staff in
order to gain access to patients. 270 This conflict, however, is easily
exaggerated. Administrators cannot alienate a hospital's medical staff to the
point where staff physicians place their patients elsewhere or go elsewhere
themselves. And administrators and staff providers share a number of other
concerns. It is sometimes said that hospital administrators are primarily
driven by concerns over costs, while staff providers are interested in quality
266. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (price advertising by lawyers);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(price advertising by pharmacists).
267. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462 (1986) ("even if the desired
information were in fact completely useless to the insurers and their patients in making an informed
choice.., the Federation would still not be justified in deciding on behalf of its members' customers
that they did not need the information").
268. See Havighurst & King, supra note 245, at 276.
269. See, e.g., The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et.seq. (1982).
270. See Denying Hospital Privileges, supra note 6, at 1219, 1223 and studies cited therein.
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no matter what the cost. 27 1 There is some truth in this observation, but it is
an oversimplification. In some cases, increases in efficiency within the
hospital also increase the efficiency of those who work within it. There is also
a substantial degree of shared interest in quality of care. Hospitals compete
with other hospitals (and some other forms of provider organizations) in
significant part on the basis of reputation for quality.2 72 Staff providers share
this interest. Poor quality within the hospital has an associational effect on
their own reputations. Patients may be lost if they fear admission or treatment
in a hospital whose reputation is inferior to others. In terms of shared
interests, a hospital is a loose form ofjoint venture in which conflicts are also
273
present.
A pattern of denials of staff privileges, or a policy that requires denials to a
significant number of competitors, may provide a basis for inferring adverse
competitive effects, at least where alternatives at comparable cost are not
available to those denied. Denial of staff privileges to a single provider will
seldom have such effects, as already noted. 2 74 Even if the practice of this
provider is curtailed or eliminated, it is unlikely that this alone will have a
significant market impact. Assuming, however, that significant adverse effects
are likely, denial of staff privileges to physicians or others with records
reflecting incompetence or the likelihood of disruption of the hospital's
operations is justified in terms of reputation and/or efficiency. Demonstrated
incompetence increases legal liability costs and has adverse reputational
effects on both the hospital and its staff. Disruption of the staff increases
hospital costs and decreases the efficiency of particular providers on the staff.
Courts are capable of making determinations of this sort without resolving
2 75
broad quality-of-care disputes.
Denial of staff privileges to whole groups of competitors or potential
competitors poses more difficult issues. Because larger numbers of
competitors are involved, substantial adverse effects are more likely. A
hospital might, for example, follow a policy of granting surgical privileges
only to fellows of the American College of Surgeons. The exclusion of nonfellows might in a given case eliminate a large number of surgeons from the
market. On the face of it, this effect flows from the hospital's reliance on the
informational effect of ACS credentials. Moreover, such a policy may enhance
the hospital's reputation for quality in the eyes of consumers, who themselves
271. Id.
272. See supra text at notes 127-29.
273. See Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 6, at 7; Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 6,
at 609-11. Thejoint venture analogy is apt for the typical hospital in which the medical staff consists
of individual, profit-maximizing providers who are not simply employees of the hospital.
274. See supra text at notes 130-38.
275. It should be noted that in some cases termination of staff privileges of individual physicians
pursuant to state peer-review legislation may be within the state action exemption from the antitrust
laws. See supra note 121. The 1986 Health Care Quality Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100
Stat. 3784, also contains a limited antitrust exemption for physicians engaged in certain types of peer
review, as defined by the Act. The reach of the Act is not yet clear. For a full discussion see
Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 6, at 7, 32-33, 82-88.
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give weight to such credentials. Assuming that the provision of such
information is procompetitive, the hospital's use of it in this fashion seems
unobjectionable. The hospital's action also protects ACS fellows on its staff
from some degree of outside competition and may reflect an agreement
among them rather than an independent use by the hospitals of the
information such credentials convey. Given this danger, the process by which
2 76
the decision to rely solely on ACS credentials was made must be examined.
Where non-physician health care providers, such as chiropractors,
podiatrists, and nurse-midwives, are denied access to hospitals, the effects and
justifications offered are different. 2 7 7 Each of these groups provide services
that compete within a particular range of services with established physician
providers. The need for hospital access varies with each group. In most
instances, these needs can be satisfied with something less than full staff
2 78
privileges, which may not even be sought.
Consumers may prefer to use the services of such alternative providers for
a variety of personal reasons. Their presence in the market is often the result
of such consumer choice, which may be frustrated by hospital conduct that
keeps such providers from delivering services consumers desire. Moreover,
these alternative providers often price lower than their physician competitors;
their elimination from the market may therefore have direct price effects. 279
Finally, denial of hospital access to such groups may retard innovation and
development of different approaches to health care that question the
established learning of physicians. 2 8 0 In a given case, some or all of these
adverse effects may be present and significant.
Invariably, denial of access to these alternative providers is explained as a
measure to protect the public from inferior care, an explanation which in this
broad sense is not cognizable in an antitrust case. But these cases do raise
significant efficiency and reputational issues. First, in some circumstances the
presence of such alternative providers on the hospital staff might increase the
hospital's risk of legal liability and thus increase its costs. But this risk may be
276. I am assuming here that there is a substantial basis for believing that the hospital's action is
otherwise likely to have adverse competitive effects. Whether this is so will require consideration of
the power of the hospital and ACS surgeons in the market, and the alternatives available to non-ACS
surgeons. If the hospital's action is likely to have such effects, the hospital should be required to
establish that its decision was based upon the information conveyed by the credentials and that it was
in the economic interest of the hospital as a whole to do so. If, for example, the hospital's action is
induced by a market-wide agreement among ACS surgeons not to serve on the staff of any hospital
extending privileges to non-ACS surgeons, its decision does not rest solely on the information ACS
credentials convey.
277. These differences are examined in greater detail in Denying HospitalPrivileges, supra note 6, at
1219, 1237-47. See also Kissam, supra note 130, at 1212-16; Health Professionals'Access to Hospitals,supra
note 7, at 1161, 1185-98.
278. In Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210
(1984), for example, chiropractors complained only of denial of access to hospital laboratory services
and radiology facilities. Nurse-anesthetists have sought only the privilege of providing services in
hospital operating rooms. Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
279. See Denying Hospital Prnvileges, supra note 6, at 1219, 1246-47 and studies cited therein.
280. Id.at 1247.
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minimized if only limited privileges or access are allowed. 28 1 Moreover, the
assumption that alternative providers are more likely to engage in malpractice
is questionable. 2 2 Second, the hospital might incur higher costs in screening
and supervising alternative care providers. Again, however, whether this is
the case may depend on the relationship with the hospital being sought.
Third, a grant of staff privileges to groups like nurse-midwives or
chiropractors might cause injury to the quality reputation of the hospital and
its staff. Whether this is so will depend on the nature of the alternative care
group at issue (and how they are generally perceived) and on the form of
hospital affiliation they desire.
The quality-of-care focus in these cases should be on these efficiency and
reputational issues. Increased costs and adverse reputational effects cannot
simply be assumed. They will vary among alternative provider groups and
with the type of relationship at issue. Finally, where these efficiencies or other
procompetitive justifications for the exclusion of such alternative care
providers can be achieved in a reasonable, less restrictive way, the
justifications should be rejected. As noted, the hospital's legitimate needs
may be met by granting limited privileges or access to facilities without a grant
of full staff privileges. Application of competence or credentialing standards
to those within the provider group may be sufficient. Given the adverse
effects that such group exclusions may cause, consideration of such
alternatives as part of the antitrust analysis is warranted.
V
CONCLUSION

There is no single quality-of-care defense in health care antitrust cases.
To the extent such a defense might be predicated on a balancing of social
gains against adverse price and output effects, it is inconsistent with the focus
on competitive effects which is central in antitrust analysis. Nor can such a
defense be based on a dominant laudable purpose. Intent is relevant only as a
predictor of effect. Where effect is established, intent is no longer of
consequence.
Conduct that promotes efficiency, ameliorates the effects of market failures
or imperfections, or increases quality rivalry among providers is, to this
extent, procompetitive and may improve quality of care by enhancing the
competitive process. Any further accommodation of quality-of-care concerns
is a direct challenge to the central role of the market in the determination of
quality, and therefore to the relevance of antitrust itself. It is for legislatures,
not courts, to grant antitrust exemptions or otherwise displace the application
of the antitrust laws.
281.
may be
the risk
282.

In such cases, the availability of limited privileges or other narrowly defined relationships
a reasonably less restrictive alternative to the same end, permitting the hospital to deal with
of increased liability without allowing the hospital to justify total non-affiliation.
See Denying Hospital Privileges, supra note 6, at 1242.

